



# Giving Voice to the Voiceless

## Good Governance, Human Development & Mass Communications

**Pippa Norris**

Shorenstein Center  
John F. Kennedy School of Government  
Harvard University  
Cambridge, MA 02138  
Pippa\_Norris@Harvard.edu  
www.pippanorris.com

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**Synopsis:** The growth in electoral democracies presents many potential opportunities for human development. Yet in practice transitional and consolidating democracies often remain fragile and incomplete, lacking strong institutions essential for effective voice and accountability, including freedom of expression and widespread opportunities for civic engagement. What can be done to strengthen democratic development and, in particular what is the role of the media in this process?

Part I suggests that the mass media will have a positive impact on good governance and human development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account and as a civic forum facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate. Yet in practice the press is often limited in these roles. Liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent fourth estate as a check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions: (i) where there is an unfettered and independent free press, *and* (ii) where there is widespread access to mass communications. Part II outlines the comparative methodology, operationalizes the typology, and then compares media access and freedom in 135 nations around the world. Part III examines the cross-national evidence for the impact of these patterns.

The study confirms that media systems characterized by widespread mass access *and* by an independent press are most closely associated with systematic indicators of good governance and human development. In particular, nations with these types of media system experience less corruption, greater administrative efficiency, higher political stability, and more effective rule of law, as well as better development outcomes such as higher per capita income, greater literacy, less economic inequality, lower infant mortality rates, and greater public spending on health. The conclusion considers the policy implications, suggesting practical steps to strengthen the channels of mass communications in poorer societies lacking either widespread access or freedom of the press.

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For Frank Esser and Barbara Pfetsch Eds. *Political Communication Research in Comparative Perspective*.

The growth in electoral democracies presents many potential opportunities for human development. The last quarter of the twentieth century witnessed a dramatic expansion in political rights and civil liberties worldwide. Since the start of the 'third wave' of democratization, in 1974, the proportion of states that are electoral democracies has more than doubled, and the number of democratic governments in the world has tripled<sup>1</sup>. Countries as diverse as the Czech Republic, Mexico and South Africa have experienced a radical transformation of their political systems through the establishment of more effective party competition, free and fair elections, and a more independent and pluralistic press. Many hoped that these developments would expand the voice of the disadvantaged and the accountability of governments, so that policymakers would become more responsive to human needs, and governments could be removed from power through the ballot box if citizens became dissatisfied by their performance.

Yet in practice, after the initial surge in the early 1990s, many electoral democracies in Latin America, Central Europe, and Sub-Saharan Africa remain fragile and only poorly consolidated, often divided by ethnic conflict and plagued by a faltering economic performance, with excessive executive power in the hands of one predominant party and a fragmented opposition<sup>2</sup>. The central danger, illustrated by the nations of the Andean region, lies in disillusionment with democracy, and even occasional reversals<sup>3</sup>. Achieving their full democratic potential depends on widening and deepening the institutions of voice and accountability, which commonly remain deeply flawed. The key issue examined here is whether there is systematic evidence that channels of mass communications play a vital role in strengthening good governance and human development, as liberal theorists have long claimed.

*Part I* theorizes that the mass media will have a positive impact on democratization and human development if they function effectively as a watchdog holding the powerful to account and as a civic forum facilitating a diversity of voices in public debate. Yet in practice the press is often limited in these roles, and in many authoritarian regimes, far from serving the needs of the public, the channels of communication reinforce state control and the power of established interests. Liberal theories stress the importance of an independent fourth estate as a check on the abuse of power. The study suggests that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions: (i) where channels of mass communications are free and independent of established interests, and in addition (ii) where there is widespread diffusion and public access to these media. Both independence *and* access are required. Freedom of the press by itself is insufficient to guarantee development outcomes if poor people are excluded from

media markets and the information resources provided by newspapers, radios, television, and now Internet technologies. Moreover media access is insufficient, if the press is subservient to established interests, uncritical of government failures, and unable to hold the powerful to account for their actions. *Part II* outlines the comparative methodology, adopting the 'most different' research strategy, and operationalizes this typology to classify and compare media systems in 135 nations around the world. *Part III* examines the cross-national evidence for the impact of these patterns. The study confirms that countries with media systems characterized by widespread mass access *and* by an independent free press experience less corruption, greater administrative efficiency, higher political stability, and more effective rule of law, as well as better social outcomes such as higher per capita income, greater literacy, lower economic inequality, lower infant mortality rates, and greater public spending on health. The *conclusion* considers the implications of the results and the advantages of a broad cross-national approach in understanding political communications.

### **I. Theories of the Role of Mass Communications**

What is the role of the mass media in strengthening voice and accountability in good governance and human development<sup>4</sup>? Liberal theorists from Milton through Locke and Madison to John Stuart Mill have argued that a free and independent press within each nation can play a vital role in the process of democratization by contributing towards the right of freedom of expression, thought and conscience, strengthening the responsiveness of governments to all citizens, and providing a pluralist platform of political expression for a multiplicity of groups<sup>5</sup>. Recent years have seen growing recognition that this process is not just valuable in itself, but that it is also vital to the human development. This perspective is exemplified by Amartya Sen's argument that political freedoms are linked to improved economic development outcomes and good governance in low-income countries, through their intrinsic value, their instrumental role in enhancing the voice of poor people, and their impact on generating informed choices about economic needs<sup>6</sup>. The guarantee of freedom of expression and information is regarded as a basic human right in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN in 1948, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. In the words of the president of the World Bank, James D. Wolfensohn, "A free press is not a luxury. A free press is at the absolute core of equitable development, because if you cannot enfranchise poor people, if they do not have a right to expression, if there is no searchlight on corruption and inequitable practices, you cannot build the public consensus needed to bring about change."<sup>7</sup>

In modern societies, the availability of information is critical to the quality of decision making by citizens and policymakers. In economic markets, consumers need accurate and reliable information to compare and evaluate products and services. In political markets, electors need information to judge the record of government and to select among alternative candidates and parties. If citizens are poorly informed, if they lack practical knowledge, they may cast ballots that fail to reflect their real interests<sup>8</sup>. Moreover policymakers need accurate information about citizens, to respond to public concerns, to deliver effective services meeting real human needs and also, in democracies, to maximize popular electoral support to be returned to office. Information in the political marketplace comes from two primary sources. Personal interactions commonly include informal face-to-face political conversations with friends, family and colleagues, traditional campaign rallies, community forums, and grassroots meetings. These information resources remain important, especially for election campaigns in poorer democracies, and the growth of email and online discussion groups may revive the importance of personal political communications<sup>9</sup>. But these channels have been supplemented in modern campaigns by the mass media, including the printed press (newspapers and magazines), electronic broadcasts (radio and television news), and also more recently the bundle of technologies associated with the Internet (including political websites). The rise of the Internet may be a particularly important development for the process of democratization, due to its potential for interactive, horizontal linkages breaking down the traditional boundaries of space and time, and facilitating oppositional voices, new social movements, and transnational advocacy networks, despite the highly uneven distribution of these technologies around the globe<sup>10</sup>.

Classical liberal theories suggest that the free press serves to strengthen the process of democratization and human development in their '*watchdog*' role, where the channels of mass communications function to promote government transparency and public scrutiny of those in authority, highlighting policy failures, maladministration by public officials, corruption in the judiciary, and scandals in the corporate sector<sup>11</sup>. Ever since Edmund Burke, the 'fourth estate' has traditionally been regarded as one of the classic checks and balances in the division of powers<sup>12</sup>. Investigative journalism can open the government's record to external scrutiny and critical evaluation, and hold authorities accountable for their actions, whether public sector institutions, non-profit organizations, or private companies.

Equally vital, in their *civic forum* role, liberal theories argue that the free press can provide a public sphere, mediating between citizens and the state, facilitating informed debate about the major issues of the day<sup>13</sup>. If the channels of communication reflect the social and cultural diversity

within each society, in a fair and impartial balance, then multiple interests and voices are heard in public deliberation. This role is particularly important during political campaigns. Fair access to the airwaves by opposition parties, candidates and groups is critical for competitive, free and fair elections. It is particularly important that state-owned or public television stations should be open to a plurality of political viewpoints and viewpoints during campaigns, without favoring the government. This principle has been recognized in jurisprudence from countries as varied as Ghana, Sri Lanka, Belize, India, Trinidad and Tobago, and Zambia<sup>14</sup>.

What empirical evidence supports the claims made in liberal theories? Early accounts assumed a fairly simple and straightforward relationship between the spread of modern forms of mass communications, socioeconomic development, and the process of democratization. Early studies in the late 1950s and early 1960s by Lerner, Lipset, Pye, Cutright, among others, suggested that the diffusion of mass communications represented one sequential step in the development process. In this perspective, urbanization and the spread of literacy lead to growing use of modern technologies such as telephones, newspapers, radios and television, and the diffusion of the mass media laid the basis for an informed citizenry able to participate in democratic life<sup>15</sup>. Based on simple correlation analysis, showing a strong connection between the spread of communications and political development, Daniel Lerner theorized: "The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third stage, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies."<sup>16</sup> Yet in the late 1960s and early 1970s the assumption that the modernization process involved a series of sequential steps gradually fell out of fashion. Skepticism grew, faced with the complexities of human development evident in different parts of the world, major setbacks for democracy with the 'second reverse wave' experienced in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Asia<sup>17</sup>, and growing recognition that control of newspapers and television broadcasting could be used effectively to prop up authoritarian regimes and reinforce the power of multinational corporations, as much as to advance human rights and provide a voice for the disadvantaged<sup>18</sup>.

### *Limits on the Free Press*

Despite liberal ideals, in practice channels of communication can and often do fail to strength democracy, for many reasons. Limitations on the role of the press include explicit attempts at government propaganda, official censorship, legal restrictions on freedom of expression and publication like stringent libel laws and official secrecy acts, partisan bias in campaign coverage, oligopolies in commercial ownership, and more subtle unfairness in the balance of interests and whose voices are commonly heard in the public sphere<sup>19</sup>. There are multiple examples.

- State control of information, particularly via state regulation and ownership of radio and television broadcasting, can reinforce ideological hegemony for autocratic regimes, and this may have negative consequences for social development<sup>20</sup>. In Malaysia and Singapore, for example, regimes have used the press to stifle internal dissent and forced journalists employed by the international press to modify or suppress news stories unflattering to the regime<sup>21</sup>.
- Governments in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, among others, commonly place serious restrictions on press freedom through official regulations, legal restrictions and censorship<sup>22</sup>. This practice remains more difficult in cyberspace, but nevertheless state-controlled monopolies exert control over access and content through providing the only Internet service in some nations<sup>23</sup>.
- During elections pro-government bias on television and radio has failed to provide a level playing field for all parties in many countries, exemplified by recent campaigns in Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Mozambique<sup>24</sup>.
- Statistics collected by media freedom organizations show that each year dozens of media professionals are killed or injured in the course of their work. In many parts of the world, journalists face the daily threat of personal danger from wars, internal conflict, coups, terrorism and vendettas<sup>25</sup>. In Colombia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Zimbabwe and Egypt there are many cases of journalists, broadcasters and editors experiencing intimidation, harassment and imprisonment by the police and military.
- Some express concern about concentration of ownership in the hands of major multinational corporations with multimedia empires around the globe. Well-known examples include AOL Time Warner and the Walt Disney Corporation in the United

States, News International in Australia, Bertelsmann in Germany, Thomson in Canada, and Fininvest in Italy<sup>26</sup>. It is feared that media mergers may have concentrated excessive control in the hands of a few multinational corporations, which remain unaccountable to the public, reducing media pluralism<sup>27</sup>.

Therefore in practice, far from strengthening the voice of marginalized and disadvantaged groups, and bolstering government accountability to citizens, the mass media may instead serve to reinforce the control of powerful interests and governing authorities. The long-term dangers of these practices are that electoral democracies experience ineffective governance and growing disillusionment with representative institutions, hindering the process of democratization and human development, while communication channels strengthen the control of governing parties and established elites in non-democratic states.

## **II: Comparing Media Systems**

This study seeks to understand the role media systems in development by comparing many countries around the globe. As discussed elsewhere in this volume, much existing research on political communications is based upon studies of the United States, as well as paired cross-national comparisons, for example between Britain and Germany. But there are major problems in attempts to generalize from one or two countries to map out broader relationships. As Lipset has long stressed, the United States, in particular, is so 'exceptional' in its political system that it is atypical of many other nations<sup>28</sup>. The individualistic values and particular constitutional structures created at the founding of the United States sets a specific cultural milieu. Particular circumstances, particular historical legacies, and particular institutional structures may well structure the American media system. For example, the predominance of the commercial broadcasting channels mean that tendencies in American network news may well prove different to media systems where public service broadcasting has a long tradition. The US is also distinctive from equivalent established democracies in Europe for many other reasons, such as the marathon length and sheer frequency of American elections, the role of private funding in campaigns, the importance of entrepreneurial candidates over parties, the lack of a significant national newspaper sector, the complexity and fragmentation of the policymaking process, and the culture and traditions of journalism.

Another body of research, exemplified by the Euromedia group, has compared political communications within established West European democracies, while others have compared media systems in affluent postindustrial states<sup>29</sup>. Yet it is not clear how far we can generalize

more widely from these particular contexts to middle and low-income countries around the globe. West European media systems that gradually evolved in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century, following the long-term process of industrialization, are unlikely to be similar to those found in Latin American, African, Middle Eastern, or Central European states. Where distinctive historical experiences stamp their cultural mark on different global regions, they may continue to influence patterns of political coverage today, in a path-dependent pattern. Another common approach is that many edited collections consist primarily of country-by-country case studies, from established and consolidating democracies, within a loose theoretical framework. This is a step in the right direction, for example when comparing changes in campaign communications, but nevertheless it still remains difficult to develop and test more systematic comparisons from separate studies of particular nations<sup>30</sup>. Unlike some other fields of comparative politics, such as the study of parties, electoral systems and voting behaviour, or constitutions, political communications lacks strong and well-established conceptual typologies. The best known classification of media systems, Siebert, Peterson and Schram's 'Four Theories of the Press', developed at the height of the Cold War era, is now so dated as to provide little contemporary value<sup>31</sup>. As a result of all these problems, older comparative politics textbooks commonly relegated the mass media to a minor player as an agent of political socialization, or a channel of interest group demands, at most, rather than as an institution and political actor in its own right<sup>32</sup>.

Given these considerations, this study follows the well-known conceptualization of Prezeworski and Teune in adopting the 'most different systems' research design, seeking to maximize contrasts among societies worldwide to distinguish systematic clusters of characteristics associated with different dimensions of the mass media<sup>33</sup>. The comparison includes some of the most affluent countries in the world like Sweden, Germany and the United States, those characterized by middle-level human development and transitional economies typified by nations such as Taiwan, Brazil and South Africa, as well as poorer rural societies, like India and China. Some states under comparison are governed by authoritarian regimes while others have experienced a rapid consolidation of democracy within the last decade. Today the Czech Republic, Latvia and Argentina are ranked as equally 'free' as West European nations with a long tradition of democracy, such as Belgium, France, and the Netherlands<sup>34</sup>. Clearly there are some important trade-offs involved in this approach, notably the loss of the richness and depth that can come from case-study comparison of a few similar countries within relatively homogeneous regions. A broader canvass increases the complexity of comparing societies that vary widely in terms of cultural legacies, political systems, and democratic traditions. There are



major limitations in understanding the processes at work behind any patterns we establish at one point in time. Ideally temporal as well as cross-national comparisons should be integrated. Aggregate data collected for other purposes, such as the circulation of newspapers or the distribution of TV sets, provides only an approximate proxy indicators for the matters we wish to investigate, such as actual readership or viewership patterns. The series of Eurobarometer surveys provide thirty years of trends in media use within EU member states, but we are only starting to get equivalent measures in reliable cross-national surveys elsewhere, and media items are still not standard even in the International Social Survey Programme and national election studies. In short, our hands are tied. Despite these well-known limitations, the strategy of attempting a global comparison, where data is available, has multiple advantages for sharpening our conceptual frameworks, broadening our understanding, and establishing reliable cross-national generalizations.

Liberal theories have long stressed the importance of an independent journalism as a check on the abuse of power. The study theorizes that this is necessary but not sufficient, in particular media systems strengthen good governance and promote positive development outcomes most effectively under two conditions: In societies where channels of mass communications are free and independent of established interests; *and* in addition where there is widespread public access to these media. The reason is that freedom of the press by itself is insufficient to guarantee positive development outcomes if disadvantaged groups and marginalized communities are excluded from the information resources provided by the mass media. For example, the potential impact of the Internet on democracy and social progress will continue to be limited if there is no closure of the digital divide, and if online political resources, as well as access to basic information about jobs, educational opportunities, news, and social networks, are unavailable to many poorer populations in large swathes of Sub-Saharan Africa, South-East Asia and Latin America<sup>35</sup>. Yet access to communications is insufficient by itself, if the printed press remain subservient to established interests, if television news fails to report government policy failures, if radio broadcasters are unable to hold the powerful to account for their actions, and if there are relatively few websites reflecting the concerns of local groups and minority languages in poorer societies. For communication channels to function effectively in accordance with the hopes of liberal theory we can theorize that access and independence are required (see Figure 1).

[Figure 1 about here]

Levels of access influence the scope and reach of mediated channels of communication, how widely politicians can reach the public through the press, as well as how far citizens can use these channels to learn about public affairs. The wider the level of access to news from daily papers, radio, television and the Internet then, *ceteris paribus*, the greater the potential for media impact. Access to the mass communications most commonly includes the printed press (newspapers and magazines), the traditional electronic broadcast media (radio and television), and the new technologies associated with the Internet (including email and the World Wide Web). *Media access* can be measured by World Development Indicators monitoring the circulation of daily newspapers, and the distribution of radio receivers and television sets per 1000 population in 135 nations, the proportion of the population online population and the weighted distribution of Internet hosts (see Table A1)<sup>36</sup>. These indicators of media diffusion are strongly inter-related (all correlations are strong and significant ( $R=0.55$  and above Sig.01), although there are some societies which rely more heavily than average upon the printed press, such as South Korea, Norway, Romania and Israel, while other countries are more reliant upon television in patterns of media use, such as the United States, Portugal and El Salvador (see Appendix Figure 1). Given the strong correlations, access to all mass media were combined into a single scale, standardized to 100-points, including the per capita circulation of daily newspapers, the availability of radio receivers and television sets, and the proportion of the population that used the Internet and the distribution of Internet hosts. As the scale was heavily skewed towards richer nations, using a logged scale normalized the distribution.

*Press freedom* can be expected to influence whether the impact of the news media promotes pluralistic voice and government accountability, or how far it serves to reinforce the power of established interests and state control. Press freedom is far more complex and difficult to assess in any comprehensive fashion but the annual Freedom House Press Freedom Survey (2000) can be used as the standard cross-national indicator. Press Freedom is measured by how much the diversity of news content is influenced by the structure of the news industry, legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists. The assessment of press freedom distinguishes between the broadcast and print media, and the resulting ratings are expressed as a 100-point scale for each country under comparison. Evaluations of press freedom in 186 nations were available in the 2000 Freedom House survey.

[Figure 2 about here]

### *The Map of Media Systems*

Figure 2 shows the distribution of 135 nations across these dimensions. The scatter of societies in the top-right hand corner shows that in many older democracies, as well as some newer democracies such as the Czech Republic, Thailand, the Republic of Korea, Jamaica, and Venezuela, liberal patterns of press freedom are strongly related to widespread media access. Some of these societies are among the most affluent around the globe, yet only moderate levels of human development characterize others such as South Africa, El Salvador, and Poland. In contrast, in societies located in the top left-hand corner of the map, exemplified by Singapore, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Russia, there is relatively widespread access to most modern forms of mass media like television and yet limited freedom of the press, suggesting the greatest potential for domestic news channels to be used by government, official agencies and established interests as an agency of partisan bias, or even state propaganda, with a scope which reaches large sectors of the population<sup>37</sup>.

Media systems in countries like India, Botswana, Namibia and the Philippines, located in the bottom right-hand corner of the scatter plot, are characterized by a flourishing independent press and yet limited public access to newspapers, television, and the Internet, due to problems of literacy and poverty. In these countries, the media can be expected to have a positive impact on pluralism and government accountability, especially through competition among elites in civil society, but to exert only limited influence on the general population because of its limited reach. Lastly, most low-income nations are scattered in the bottom left-hand corner, such as Angola, Rwanda, Cambodia and Bangladesh, where there are major restrictions on the freedom of the press as a force capable of challenging government authorities, and yet the role of the media is also limited as a channel of state propaganda because of restricted levels of mass access to newspapers, television and the Internet. In these nations, traditional forms of campaign communication such as local rallies, posters and community meetings, and grassroots party organizations, are likely to be more important in mobilizing political support than mediated channels.

### **III. The Impact of Media Systems on Human Development**

What is the impact of this pattern on good governance and human development? Recent years have seen growing attempts to gauge and measure systematic, valid and reliable indicators of political development and the quality of democracy in a wide range of countries worldwide. We can draw on a recent study for the World Bank<sup>38</sup> that developed subjective perceptions of

indicators of good governance, drawing on multiple surveys of experts, that assessed four dimensions based on the criteria of political stability, the rule of law, government efficiency and levels of corruption (see the Technical Appendix for details). Political stability is important as this reflects the regular rotation of government office, consolidation of the 'rules of the game', continuity in constitutional practices, and lack of political violence due to acts of terrorism. The rule of law concerns the independence and effectiveness of the judiciary and courts, perceptions of violent or non-violent crime, and the enforceability of contracts. Government efficiency is gauged by perceptions of the quality of the public service and the independence of the civic service from political pressures. Lastly perceptions of corruption reflect the success of a society in developing fair, transparent and predictable rules for social and economic interactions. Subjective judgments may prove unreliable for several reasons, including reliance upon a small number of national 'experts', the use of business leaders and academic scholars as the basis of the judgments, variations in country coverage by different indices, and possible bias towards more favorable evaluations of countries with good economic outcomes. Nevertheless in the absence of other reliable indicators covering a wide range of nations, such as surveys of public opinion, these measures provide one of the best available gauges of good governance<sup>39</sup>. If widespread access to the free press plays an important role in promoting government accountability, then this should be evident in these indicators. Table 1 and Figure 3 shows the simple correlations between these indicators without any controls. The results confirm that the indicators of media access, press freedom and the combined communications index were all strongly and significantly related to good governance. Countries where much of the public has access to the free press have the greater political stability, rule of law, government efficiency in the policy process, and least corruption.

[Table 1 and Figure 3 about here]

Liberal theories claims claim that in addition to promoting a more efficient public policy process, by publicizing social problems and articulating public concerns mass communications also function to make the authorities more responsive to basic human needs. Table 2 examines the correlations between the communication measures and several common indicators of human development. The results confirm that press freedom, access to the mass media, and the combined Communication Index are all strongly related to positive development outcomes, measured by the Human Development Index, income, economic equality, lower infant mortality, longer life expectancy, higher spending on public health, and greater adult literacy. These coefficients need to be interpreted with caution, as no controls are included, and the causal

interpretation of these relationships is not unambiguous<sup>40</sup>. In particular it could well be argued that greater levels of economic prosperity produced by development generate the underlying conditions for the purchase of household consumer durables like televisions, radios, and personal computers. The expansion of the middle class service sector in more developed economies is associated with greater affluence and growing leisure time, which are both strongly linked to use of the mass media. Use of newspapers and the Internet, in particular, require cognitive skills and knowledge that are strongly related to levels of education and literacy. Nevertheless, despite a process of interaction, the consistent and strong relationship across all the different indicators of human development and good governance is striking.

[Tables 2, 3 and 4 and Figure 4 about here]

The relationship between the typology of media systems and these indicators are illustrated in Tables 3 and 4. The results confirm that the 52 societies with widespread access to the free press consistently scored far higher than all other media systems across all the indicators of good governance and human development: people living in these nations have more stable political systems, more efficient government processes and less corruption, as well as living longer, with greater affluence, and more economic equality. In sharp contrast, countries lacking an independent press and public access to mass communications scored consistently worst across all these indicators. Media matters, both for its own sake, and for development.

### **Conclusions: Strengthening Channels of Voice and Accountability**

The lessons from this analysis suggest that strengthening the channels of communication is vital for development, particularly for electoral democracies that are in the process of establishing more effective political and economic institutions. It is widely assumed that a free press is necessary for social and political development, although this proposition is rarely tested in any systematic fashion. Because many studies are conducted within affluent societies, where newspapers and television are widely available, the basic issue of access to the mass media is rarely linked explicitly to issues of how the press functions within a democracy. The results indicate that those societies characterized by both press freedom and widespread access to the mass media are characterized by many indicators of good governance and human development. The reason, it is suggested, is that the free press plays an important role in promoting the voice of disadvantaged groups in the policymaking process and strengthening the accountability of governments to citizens. Liberal theories, which focus on only the conditions of independent

journalism without taking account of the problems of restricted access, tell only one half of the story.


More generally, the global comparative approach adopted by this study suggests that we can go beyond more limited case studies of particular countries, or research that contrasts media systems among a few countries within a particular region or continent. Clearly there is a need for complimentary multi-method research designs, which benefit from combining the strengths and weaknesses of any single approach. For example, it is difficult to go beyond the simple correlations examined here to establish patterns of causality that could be explored by detailed historical case studies. Other approaches such as interviews with media and policy elites would provide alternative insights into this process, such as how far journalists see their role as watchdogs. Systematic content analysis could reveal patterns of news coverage, for example reporting of incidents of the abuse of government power or cases of corruption. Surveys could shed light on audience patterns of use and the impact of news coverage on political attitudes and values. No single method is wholly satisfactory. Nevertheless the end of the Cold War and dramatic changes in human development in recent decades have broken down the old tripartite distinctions between post-industrial, post-communist and developing societies, as well as between established democracies, consolidating democracies and non-democracies. The process of globalization and the rise of new information technologies have similarly transformed the subject. We are commonly still stuck in the rut of studying the mass media within particular nation-states, when some of the most electric transformative movements fall outside of these boundaries<sup>41</sup>. Studies of political communication need to revise and retool our conceptual frameworks to reflect these developments. A broad-brush comparative framework utilizing aggregate data in many different nations around the world, mapping media systems, is one more research strategy that should be added to our comparative toolbox.

Figure 1: Typology of Media Systems


		Press Freedom	
		Non-free	Free
Media Access	Widespread Access	E.g. Singapore, Belarus, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia	E.g. Argentina, Brazil, Estonia, Jamaica, Poland, UK, U.S.
	Limited Access	E.g. Bangladesh, Rwanda, Algeria, Yemen, Zimbabwe	E.g. Mali, Namibia, the Philippines, South Africa

**Notes: Measures of media access and press freedom. See technical appendix for details.**


Figure 2: Types of Media Systems







**Figure 3: Communication Index and Indicators of Good Governance**  
See technical appendix for details.



**Figure 4: Communication Index and Indicators of Human Development**  
See technical appendix for details.




Figure 4: Communication Index and Indicators of Human Development Cont...

**Table 1: Correlations between Media and Indicators of Good Governance**

		Press Freedom (2000)	Media Access (Logged %Papers+ %TVs+ %Radio +%Online 1997-1999)	Communication Index
Political Stability/Violence	R	<b>.633</b>	<b>.633</b>	<b>.727</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	140	119	120
Rule of Law	R	<b>.644</b>	<b>.682</b>	<b>.763</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	151	124	125
Government Efficiency	R	<b>.688</b>	<b>.649</b>	<b>.771</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	141	120	121
Corruption	R	<b>.674</b>	<b>.652</b>	<b>.788</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	140	119	120

**Notes: See technical appendix for details.**

**Table 2: Correlations between Media and Human Development Indicators**

		Press Freedom (2000)	Media Access (Logged %Papers+ %TVs+ %Radio +%Online 1997-1999)	Communication Index
Human Development Index 1999 UNDP	R	<b>.519</b>	<b>.879</b>	<b>.801</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	167	127	128
Income (Per Capita GDP in PPP US\$ 1997)	R	<b>.508</b>	<b>.752</b>	<b>.793</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	167	127	128
Economic Equality (Reversed Gini Index)	R	<b>.246</b>	<b>.401</b>	<b>.403</b>
	Sig.	.009	.000	.000
	N	113	101	101
Lower Infant Mortality	R	<b>.405</b>	<b>.813</b>	<b>.670</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	142	129	130
Public expenditure on health (% of GDP)	R	<b>.475</b>	<b>.604</b>	<b>.659</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	140	127	128
Life Expectancy (yrs) UNDP 1999	R	<b>.464</b>	<b>.803</b>	<b>.700</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	168	127	128
Adult literacy rate % 1997 UNDP	R	<b>.404</b>	<b>.776</b>	<b>.673</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	167	127	128
% With secondary education 1999 UNDP	R	<b>.459</b>	<b>.766</b>	<b>.731</b>
	Sig.	.000	.000	.000
	N	125	100	101

**Notes: See technical appendix for details.**

**Table 3: Mean scores on good governance indicators by type of media system**

Type of Media System	N.	Political Stability	Rule of Law	Government Efficiency	Corruption
Limited access to non-free press	59	-.65	-.63	-.65	-.60
Limited access to free press	22	-.28	-.16	-.22	-.34
Wide access to non-free press	17	-.09	.02	-.11	-.22
<b>Wide access to free press</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>.74</b>	<b>.80</b>	<b>.73</b>	<b>.80</b>

**Notes: See technical appendix for details.**

**Table 4: Mean scores on human development indicators by type of media system**

Type of Media System	N.	Human Development Index 1999	Per Capita PPP GDP US\$ 1997	Gini Index 2001	Infant mortality per 1000 live births 1999	Public expenditure on health % of GDP	Adult literacy rate % 1997	% With Secondary education 1999
Limited access to non-free press	68	.560	3208	42.1	67.5	2.1	66.3	52.2
Limited access to free press	31	.619	3621	47.0	64.6	2.9	71.0	53.1
Wide access to non-free press	17	.759	7919	40.2	16.2	4.1	89.3	70.3
<b>Wide access to free press</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>.843</b>	<b>14278</b>	<b>34.8</b>	<b>11.7</b>	<b>4.8</b>	<b>95.7</b>	<b>83.2</b>
Total	167	.678	7183	39.7	42.1	3.4	78.5	65.6

**Notes: See technical appendix for details.**

**Technical Appendix:**

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition and source</b>
<b>MEDIA ACCESS</b>	
Newspapers	Daily newspaper circulation (published at least 4 times a week) per 1000 people (1996) UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1999
TV Sets	Television sets in use per 1000 people, 1999. International Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database 2000.
Radio Receivers	Radio receivers in use per 1000 people, 1997. International Telecommunications Union World Telecommunications Indicators Database 2000.
Online Users	The percentage of online users in the adult population derived from national surveys asking respondents whether they use email or the world wide web. The figures represent the latest survey available in fall 2000. <a href="http://www.NUA.ie">www.NUA.ie</a> .
Hosts	Computers with active Internet Protocol (IP) addresses connected to the Internet, per 100 people, July 2000, <a href="http://www.Netcraft.com">www.Netcraft.com</a> . Hosts without a country code identification were weighted and relocated. See Pippa Norris. 2001. Digital Divide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Press Freedom Scale	Diversity of news content is measured in the 2000 Freedom House annual survey of Press Freedom according to the structure of the news industry, legal and administrative decisions, the degree of political influence or control, the economic influences exerted by the government or private entrepreneurs, and actual incidents violating press autonomy, including censorship, harassment and physical threats to journalists. The 100-point scale combines the broadcasting and newspaper scores and the scale is reversed so that a higher score represents greater press freedom. <a href="http://www.FreedomHouse.org">www.FreedomHouse.org</a>
Media Access	A summary logged standardized scale of the proportion of newspapers, TV Sets, Radio Receivers, Online Users and Internet Hosts.
Communication Index	This combines the Logged Media Access Scale and the Press Freedom Scale.
<b>HUMAN DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS</b>	
Human Development	The Human Development Index (1998) is based on longevity, as measured by life expectancy at birth; educational achievement; and standard of living, as measured by per capita GDP (PPP \$US). UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Per Capita GDP	Measured in \$US in Purchasing Power Parity, 1998. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Economic Equality	The Gini Index measures the extent to which the distribution of income within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. The index has been reversed so that 1 represents perfect equality. World Development Indicators

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	2001 World Bank.
Lower Infant Mortality	The number of infants dying before the age of one year, per 1000 live births, 1999. The indicator has been reversed so that a higher figure represents lower infant mortality. World Development Indicators 2001 World Bank
Public health expenditure	Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government budgets, external borrowings and grants as a percentage of GDP, 1997-99. World Development Indicators 2001 World Bank.
Life expectancy	Life expectancy at birth (years) 1995-2000. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
Adult literacy rate	Literacy as a percentage of adults (15 and above) 1998. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
% Secondary education	Secondary age group enrolment as a percentage of the relevant age group, 1997. UNDP Human Development Report 2000.
<b>GOVERNANCE INDICATORS</b>	
Political stability	An aggregated measure of political stability and violence based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.
Rule of Law	An aggregated measure of rule of law based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.
Government efficiency	An aggregated measure of government efficiency based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.
Corruption	An aggregated measure of corruption based on expert assessments Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196, Washington DC.

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Table A1: Measures of Press Freedom, Media Access and the Communication Index

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
1	Afghanistan	10	.	.	.	.	.	.
2	Albania	44	36	217	113	.0	7	37.8
3	Algeria	17	38	241	107	.0	8	15.1
4	Angola	20	11	54	15	.1	2	4.1
5	Antigua and Barbuda	54	.	.	.	4.3	.	.
6	Argentina	59	123	681	293	1.0	22	79.4
7	Armenia	43	23	224	238	.1	9	41.7
8	Australia	90	293	1376	706	37.4	55	156.5
9	Austria	88	296	753	516	5.5	33	133.7
10	Azerbaijan	30	27	23	254	.0	6	23.5
11	Bahrain	25	.	.	.	5.4	.	.
12	Bangladesh	40	9	50	7	.0	1	4.6
13	Barbados	84	.	.	.	1.9	.	.
14	Belarus	20	174	296	322	.1	16	23.9
15	Belgium	91	160	793	523	19.8	34	139.2
16	Belize	75	.	.	.	4.3	.	.
17	Benin	70	2	108	11	.1	2	26.9
18	Bhutan	24	.	.	.	.	.	.
19	Bolivia	78	55	675	118	.1	17	95.9
20	Bosnia & Herzegovina	44	152	248	112	.0	9	41.6
21	Botswana	72	27	156	20	.2	4	44.3
22	Brazil	67	40	444	333	4.1	17	82.2
23	Brunei	26	.	.	.	3.1	.	.
24	Bulgaria	70	257	543	408	1.8	24	97.0
25	Burkina Faso	60	1	33	11	.0	1	-3.8
26	Burundi	17	3	71	15	.0	2	3.3
27	Cambodia	39	2	127	9	.0	5	27.4
28	Cameroon	23	7	163	34	.0	4	14.0
29	Canada	86	159	1077	715	41.9	49	145.0
30	Cape Verde	68	.	.	.	.0	.	.
31	Central African Rep.	40	2	83	6	.0	2	10.2
32	Chad	28	0	242	1	.0	5	19.2
33	Chile	73	98	354	240	1.0	14	83.5
34	China	20	.	333	292	.7	.	.
35	Colombia	41	46	581	199	.9	17	50.5
36	Comoros	60	.	.	.	.1	.	.
37	Congo, Dem. Rep.	23	8	375	2	.1	10	23.4
38	Costa Rica	84	94	271	229	.8	15	99.4
39	Cote D'Ivoire	26	17	164	70	.04	5	18.2
40	Croatia	37	115	336	279	2.22	15	43.5
41	Cuba	6	118	353	246	.22	14	6.9
42	Cyprus	84	.	.	.	4.35	.	.
43	Czech Republic	80	254	803	487	2.83	31	119.2
44	Denmark	91	309	1141	621	20.75	46	151.4
45	Djibouti	37	.	.	.	.15	.	.
46	Dominica	84	.	.	.	.31	.	.
47	Dominican Republic	70	52	178	96	.24	7	57.2
48	Ecuador	56	70	419	205	.04	16	66.9
49	Egypt	31	40	324	183	.62	10	30.8
50	El Salvador	60	48	464	191	.50	24	82.6
51	Equatorial Guinea	22	.	.	.	.01	.	.
52	Eritrea	32	.	91	16	.03	.	.
53	Estonia	80	174	693	555	10.86	30	117.6
54	Ethiopia	38	1	195	6	.01	4	23.0
55	Fiji	42	.	.	.	.63	.	.

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
56	Finland	85	455	1496	643	28.04	60	151.1
57	France	76	218	937	623	10.60	38	119.6
58	Gabon	45	29	183	251	.27	5	32.9
59	Gambia	30	2	169	3	.04	4	16.3
60	Georgia	53	.	555	474	.09	.	.
61	Germany	87	311	948	580	14.97	40	139.6
62	Ghana	39	13	238	115	.08	7	33.0
63	Greece	70	153	477	480	1.05	22	94.3
64	Grenada	80	.	.	.	2.00	.	.
65	Guatemala	46	33	79	61	.46	5	31.6
66	Guinea-Bissau	44	5	44	.	.04	.	.
67	Guinea	29	.	47	44	.22	.	.
68	Haiti	42	3	55	5	.03	1	4.3
69	Honduras	52	55	386	95	.27	11	53.5
70	Hungary	70	186	689	448	4.96	27	100.7
71	Iceland	88	.	.	.	40.36	.	.
72	India	58	.	121	75	.08	.	.
73	Indonesia	51	24	156	143	.04	6	40.9
74	Iran	32	28	265	157	.15	9	30.6
75	Iraq	2	19	229	83	.	.	.
76	Ireland	79	150	699	406	12.00	28	114.0
77	Israel	70	290	520	328	10.17	25	97.5
78	Italy	73	104	878	488	15.68	33	110.6
79	Jamaica	89	62	480	189	1.97	15	104.4
80	Japan	81	578	955	719	15.48	48	136.4
81	Jordan	43	58	287	83	.82	8	39.1
82	Kazakhstan	32	.	384	238	.12	.	.
83	Kenya	30	9	104	22	.16	3	13.0
84	Kiribati	83	.	.	.	.38	.	.
85	Korea, Republic Of	73	393	1033	361	21.88	40	116.9
86	Kuwait	52	374	660	480	3.69	31	77.6
87	Kyrgyzstan	39	15	112	57	.05	3	21.0
88	Laos	34	4	143	10	.	.	.
89	Latvia	76	247	710	741	4.07	30	112.2
90	Lebanon	39	107	906	351	4.26	28	56.5
91	Lesotho	44	8	49	16	.03	2	9.5
92	Liberia	33	.	.	.	.01	.	.
93	Libya Arab Jamahiriyy	10	14	233	136	.	.	.
94	Lithuania	80	93	513	420	2.16	22	107.1
95	Luxembourg	90	.	.	.	11.90	.	.
96	Macedonia	58	21	200	250	1.00	10	57.1
97	Madagascar	68	5	192	22	.03	4	43.5
98	Malawi	48	3	249	3	.06	5	33.9
99	Malaysia	30	158	420	174	2.86	15	35.7
100	Maldives	35	.	.	.	.54	.	.
101	Mali	74	1	54	12	.01	1	9.5
102	Malta	83	.	.	.	5.26	.	.
103	Marshall Islands	92	.	.	.	.	.	.
104	Mauritania	33	0	151	96	.01	5	22.6
105	Mauritius	83	75	368	230	3.55	14	95.4
106	Mexico	50	97	325	267	.95	14	57.2
107	Micronesia, Fed Stat	76	.	.	.	.91	.	.
108	Moldova	42	60	740	297	.08	22	56.3
109	Mongolia	71	27	151	61	.05	5	48.6
110	Morocco	51	26	241	165	.45	9	47.7
111	Mozambique	52	3	40	5	.07	1	-6
112	Myanmar	0	10	95	7	.	.	.0
113	Namibia	66	19	144	38	.56	4	40.7

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access))
114	Nepal	41	11	38	7	.06	1	1.9
115	Netherlands	86	306	978	600	24.36	42	139.9
116	New Zealand	92	216	990	518	14.77	39	146.0
117	Nicaragua	60	30	285	69	.34	10	60.4
118	Niger	38	0	69	27	.01	2	10.8
119	Nigeria	47	24	223	68	.01	6	37.4
120	Norway	95	588	915	648	41.59	52	162.8
121	Oman	29	29	598	575	1.74	25	40.4
122	Pakistan	36	23	98	119	.04	4	22.4
123	Panama Canal Zone	70	62	299	192	1.08	11	73.4
124	Papua New Guinea	72	15	97	13	.00	3	31.3
125	Paraguay	49	43	182	205	.02	7	39.9
126	Peru	33	84	273	147	.08	10	33.1
127	Philippines	70	79	159	110	.45	7	59.2
128	Poland	81	113	523	387	5.17	22	108.9
129	Portugal	83	75	304	560	2.02	19	106.2
130	Quatar	38	.	.	.	4.58	.	.
131	Romania	56	300	319	312	.67	17	69.2
132	Russian Federation	40	105	418	421	3.66	20	51.7
133	Rwanda	28	0	102	0	.01	2	8.7
134	Saint Lucia	87	.	.	.	1.33	.	.
135	Sao Tome & Principe	73	.	.	.	.29	.	.
136	Saudi Arabia	10	57	321	263	.58	13	11.1
137	Senegal	67	5	142	41	.09	4	38.7
138	Seychelles	50	.	.	.	3.00	.	.
139	Sierra Leone	15	4	253	13	.01	5	11.0
140	Singapore	34	360	822	308	14.71	34	52.2
141	Slovakia	70	185	580	417	9.44	25	98.2
142	Slovenia	73	199	406	356	23.00	24	100.8
143	Solomon Islands	82	.	.	.	.48	.	.
144	Somalia	12	.	.	.	.	.	.
145	South Africa	75	32	317	129	4.18	10	76.0
146	Spain	82	100	333	547	7.85	21	107.7
147	Sri Lanka	30	29	209	102	.08	7	24.6
148	St. Kitts & Nevis	82	.	.	.	3.75	.	.
149	St. Vincent & Grenadine	84	.	.	.	1.82	.	.
150	Sudan	15	27	271	173	.00	8	13.3
151	Suriname	69	.	.	.	1.64	.	.
152	Swaziland	23	.	.	.	.30	.	.
153	Sweden	89	445	932	531	44.38	48	149.9
154	Switzerland	92	337	1000	518	16.44	42	148.9
155	Syrian Arab Republic	27	20	278	66	.07	7	23.4
156	Taiwan	79	.	.	.	21.84	.	.
157	Tajikstan	6	20	142	328	.	.	.
158	Tanzania	51	4	279	21	.02	6	40.0
159	Thailand	70	63	232	289	.22	11	72.0
160	Togo	26	4	218	22	.12	5	17.8
161	Trinidad & Tobago	72	123	534	337	1.56	20	93.9
162	Tunisia	26	31	223	190	.52	9	25.0
163	Turkey	42	111	180	332	.95	12	45.0
164	Turkmenistan	14	.	276	201	.	.	.
165	Uganda	60	2	128	28	.05	3	29.9
166	Ukraine	40	54	884	413	.29	29	58.3
167	United Arab Emirates	24	156	345	252	8.88	18	30.0
168	United Kingdom	80	329	1436	652	23.90	54	138.4
169	United States	87	215	2146	844	39.11	73	161.9
170	Uruguay	71	293	607	531	2.73	24	97.4

	Nation	Press Freedom 2000 (i)	Newspapers per 1000 1996 (ii)	Radios per 1000 1997 (iii)	TV sets per 1000 1999 (iv)	% Of pop. online 2000 (v)	Media Access (ii to v)	Communication Index (Freedom+ Access)
171	Uzbekistan	17	3	465	276	.04	15	19.9
172	Vanuatu	56	.	.	.	.06	.	.
173	Venezuela	66	206	468	185	.35	17	81.6
174	Viet Nam	25	4	107	184	.02	3	12.5
175	Western Samoa	66	.	.	.	.24	.	.
176	Yemen	32	15	64	286	.04	2	10.8
177	Yugoslavia	19	107	297	273	.94	13	21.5
178	Zambia	38	12	121	145	.10	5	27.9
179	Zimbabwe	33	19	93	180	.27	3	15.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>131</b>

**Notes: See technical appendix for details.**



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<sup>1</sup> See Larry Diamond. 2001. 'Consolidating Democracies.' In *Comparing Democracies 2: Elections and Voting in Global Perspective*. Eds. Lawrence LeDuc, Richard G. Niemi and Pippa Norris. London: Sage. Freedom House estimates that in 2000-2001 there were 120 electoral democracies around the world, and the highest proportion of people (40.7%) living under freedom since the survey started in 1980. See *Freedom Around the World, 2000-2001*. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).

<sup>2</sup> See Juan Linz and Alfred Stephan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Washington DC: Johns Hopkins Press.

<sup>3</sup> For trends in public opinion see Pippa Norris. Ed. 1999. *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Susan Pharr and Robert Putnam. Eds. 2000. *Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Marta Lagos. 2001. 'Between stability and crisis in Latin America.' *Journal of Democracy* 12(1). For the issue of reversal see Marc Plattner and Larry Diamond. 2001. 'High anxiety in the Andes.' *Journal of Democracy* 12(2) (Special Issue).

<sup>4</sup> For a bibliographic guide to the literature on the media and development see Clement E. Asante. *Press Freedom and Development: A Research Guide and Selected Bibliography*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. For a discussion of how alternative theories have evolved in the normative debate see H. Shah. 1996. 'Modernization, marginalization and emancipation: Toward a normative model of journalism and national development.' *Communication Theory*. 6(2); Denis McQuail. 2001. *Political Communication Theory*. London: Sage.

<sup>5</sup> Amartya Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books.

<sup>6</sup> Amartya Sen. 1999. *Development as Freedom*. New York: Anchor Books; T. Besley and R. Burgess. 2001. 'Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media.' *European Economic Review*. 45(4-6): 629-640.

<sup>7</sup> James D. Wolfenson. "Voices of the Poor," *Washington Post*, 10 November 1999, A39.

<sup>8</sup> Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>9</sup> Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Post-Industrial Societies*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

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<sup>10</sup> For a fuller discussion of this viewpoint see Chapter 1 in Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>11</sup> George A. Donohue, Philip Tichenor et al. 1995. 'A Guard Dog Perspective on the Role of the Media.' *Journal of Communication*. 45(2): 115-128.

<sup>12</sup> Renate Kocher. 1986. 'Bloodhounds or Missionaries: Role Definitions of German and British Journalists.' *European Journal of Communication*. 1: 43-64.

<sup>13</sup> See Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks. 1995. *Communication and Citizenship*. London: Routledge; Peter Dahlgren. 1995. *Television and the Public Sphere*. London: Sage.

<sup>14</sup> ACE Project. <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/me/mea01b.htm>

<sup>15</sup> For the classics in this account see Daniel Lerner. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press; Lucian W. Pye. 1963. *Communications and Political Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Seymour Martin Lipset. 1959. 'Some social prerequisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy.' *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105; Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde. 1967. 'Toward a communication theory of democratic political development: A Causal model.' *American Political Science Review* 61(1): 72-79.

<sup>16</sup> Daniel Lerner. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press p.60.

<sup>17</sup> Samuel Huntington. 1993. *The Third Wave*. Oklahoma: The University of Oklahoma Press.

<sup>18</sup> For a discussion of the criticisms of the older literature and heated debates about the role of the media in development that arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s see Hamid Mowlana. 1985. *International Flow of Information: A Global Report and Analysis* Paris, UNESCO; Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi et al. 1984. *Foreign News in the Media: International Reporting in Twenty-Nine Countries*. Reports and Papers on Mass Communication, 93. Paris, UNESCO; Robert L. Stevenson and Donald Lewis Shaw (eds). 1984. *Foreign News and the New World Information Order* Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press; K. Kyloon Hur. 1984. 'A Critical Analysis of International News Flow Research.' *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 1: 365-378; William Preston, Edwards S. Herman and Herbert I. Schiller. 1989. *Hope and Folly: The United States and UNESCO 1945-1985* Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

<sup>19</sup> Leonard R. Sussman. 2001. *Press Freedom in Our Genes*. Reston, VA: World Press Freedom Committee.

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<sup>20</sup> See Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova and Andrei Shleifer. 2001. 'Who owns the media?' Paper presented at the World Bank meeting *The Role of the Media in Development*. April.

<sup>21</sup> Garry Rodan. 1998. 'Asia and the International Press: The Political Significance of Expanding Markets.' *Democratization* 5: 125-54.

<sup>22</sup> See for example cases documented by the Index on Censorship <http://www.indexoncensorship.org/>, The World Press Freedom Council [www.wpfc.org](http://www.wpfc.org), and the International Press Institute <http://www.freemedia.at>. See also Louis Edward Inglehart. 1998. *Press and Speech Freedoms in the World, from Antiquity until 1998: A Chronology*. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.

<sup>23</sup> See Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor C. Boas. 2001. *The Internet and State Control in Authoritarian Regimes: China, Cuba and the Counterrevolution*. Global Policy Program No 21 Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Leonard R. Sussman. 2000. 'Censor Dot Gov: The Internet and Press Freedom.' *Press Freedom Survey 2000*. Washington DC: Freedom House. [www.freedomhouse.com](http://www.freedomhouse.com).

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, the Report by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe on the October 2000 parliamentary elections in Belarus available at [http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election\\_reports/by/bel200fin.pdf](http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/reports/election_reports/by/bel200fin.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> See for example the International Federation of Journalists. <http://www.ifj.org/> and the Human Rights Watch. <http://www.hrw.org/>

<sup>26</sup> See Jeremy Tunstall and Michael Palmer. 1991. *Media Moguls*. London: Routledge; Anthony Smith. 1991. *The Age of Behemoths: The Globalization of Mass Media Firms*. New York: Priority Press; Alfonso Sanchez-Taberner. 1993. *Media Concentration in Europe: Commercial Enterprises and the Public Interest*. London: John Libbey.

<sup>27</sup> Ben Bagdikian. 1997. *The Media Monopoly*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press; Leo Bogart. 1995. *Commercial Culture*; Robert McChesney. 1999. *Rich media, poor democracy: communication politics in dubious times*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press; Robert G. Picard. 1988. *Press Concentration and Monopoly: New Perspectives on Newspaper Ownership and Operation*. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.

<sup>28</sup> Seymour Martin Lipset. 1996. *American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword*. New York: W.W. Norton; Seymour Martin Lipset. 1990. *Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of Canada and the United States*. New York: Routledge.



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<sup>29</sup> See, for example, Bernt Stubbe Østergaard. Ed. 1992. *The Media in Western Europe*. London: Sage; Pippa Norris. 2000. *A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>30</sup> See, for example, David L. Swanson and Paolo Mancini. Eds. *Politics, Media and Modern Democracy*. Westport, CT: Praeger; Richard Gunter and Anthony Mughan. 2000. *Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>31</sup> Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm. 1984. (Org. 1956). *Four Theories of the Press*. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

<sup>32</sup> See, for example, one of the best-established textbooks, Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. 1992. *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*. NY: HarperCollins Publishers, a 600-page text where there are three comparative references to the mass media provided in the index.

<sup>33</sup> Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune. 1970. *The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry*. NY: Wiley-Interscience.

<sup>34</sup> These countries are ranked as equally 'free' according to the 2000-2001 Freedom House assessments of political rights and civil liberties Freedom House. 2000. *Freedom in the World 2000-2001*. [www.freedomhouse.org](http://www.freedomhouse.org).

<sup>35</sup> Pippa Norris. 2001. *Digital Divide*. NY: Cambridge University Press.

<sup>36</sup> The data for daily newspapers and radios are originally derived from UNESCO, and the information about television sets, personal computers and Internet hosts from the ITU.

<sup>37</sup> W.A. Hachten. 1989. 'Media development without press freedom – Lee Kuan Yew's Singapore.' *Journalism Quarterly* 1989. 66(4): 822-827.

<sup>38</sup> Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. 'Governance Matters.' *World Bank Policy Research Paper 2196*. Washington DC: World Bank. [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org).

<sup>39</sup> It should be noted that none of the indicators that were selected included measures of freedom of the press or media access.

<sup>40</sup> Multivariate OLS regression models were tested, including the communications index and logged per capita GDP regressed on the indicators of good governance and human development, but the multicollinearity statistics (measured by Tolerance and the Variance Inflation Factor) suggest that the

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results have to be treated with caution, as there is a strong linear relationship among the independent variables.

<sup>41</sup> For further discussion of these developments see Pippa Norris. 2002. *Democratic Phoenix: Political Activism Worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.