

# INFORMATION SECURITY AND IMAGE OF TURKEY IN THE GLOBAL MEDIA



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# **Information Security and Image of Turkey in the Global Media**

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### About Editor:

Adinda Hertoro has joined the Political Communication institute of TASAM (Turkish-Asian Centre for Strategic Studies) as an expert in 2016. In her previous career, after obtaining her Bachelor of Arts Honours Degree in Mass Communications from the London school of Public Relations – Jakarta, she joined the Press Section at the Diplomatic Mission of Pakistan in Jakarta as an assistant to the Press Attaché from 2010-2011. Later, she joined the Embassy of the Republic of Turkey as a Personal Assistant to the Ambassador and left in October 2012 to continue her Masters in Political Science and International Relations at Istanbul University. She wrote her Master Thesis with the title of “The role of ASEAN in the case of the South China Sea Disputes”. She is residing in Istanbul and while assuming her duty as an expert at the Political Communication institute of TASAM and involved in various of event managements, she is currently finishing her article, with the title of “The South China Sea Disputes: Beyond the question of who owns what” and planning to continue her study to a higher level.



## About Political Communication Institute

An Istanbul based think tank and the only research center specialized in the field, Political Communication Institute (PCI), focuses on where mediated communication and politics intersect. Founded in 2008 as a subsidiary research branch of TASAM (Turkish Asian Center for Strategic Research), one of the leading strategic studies centers in Turkey, the institute conducts research and organize events on a variety of topics among which are political campaigning, media and politics, digital media studies, political participation, impacts of technology on social processes, electoral systems and processes. PCI functions as sociopolitical studies branch of TASAM.



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## Information Security and Image of Turkey in the Global Media



# DOMESTIC POLITICS, GLOBAL MEDIA AND DECLINING IMAGE OF A NATION

Can Türe, Deputy Director

Surrounded by Syrian War in South East, diplomatic tensions with European Union and fluctuating relations with the United States, Turkey has been going through a turbulent period. Likewise, the outlook in domestic politics is also quite tense. Coup d'état attempt of July 15th, repercussions of constitutional referendum process, social divisions, failure of political institutionalization, long-standing problems with the rule of law as well as the democracy deficit all complicate matters in Turkish politics of recent years.

As a result of the above-mentioned problems, Turkey's national reputation suffers to the extent that global, predominantly Western, media flood with headlines critical of Turkish policies, and governance in Turkey at large. Representation of Turkey in Western media outlets appeared to be poor. Eventually, Turkish national brand has drastically declined.



These national reputation problems Turkey has for a while faced had to be brought under the spotlight and discussed. Debating communicative dynamics shaping national image and mechanisms of global information flow, without overlooking international and domestic politics of the country, was crucial to understand the nature of image problem Turkey has suffered from.





The only think tank specialized in the field based in Turkey, Political Communication Institute (SIE), organized a panel in November 2016 within the annually held **Istanbul Security Conference** to bring the issue into discussion, especially focusing on global media and information flow. To this end, we invited PR consultants, journalists, scholars, each of whom are leading figures in their own fields, to the panel in order to look into what shapes Turkish national identity in global media. In the following pages, you will find edited speeches delivered at the panel. **Jason Epstein**, President of Southfive Strategies LLC which managed relations of Turkey with the US legislative circles for years, lays the historical context for understanding the current point of global image of the country. **Francis Ghiles** from Barcelona Center for International Affairs presents his decades-long experience in Turkey as a veteran journalist. Another veteran journalist and a mass communication scholar, **Prof. Haluk Sahin**, in the light of framing theory, accounts for the recent swing of perception of Turkish politics by foreign media. Lastly, **Prof. Thomas A. Bauer**, a senior communication scholar from University of Vienna, investigates, in an academic fashion, the role of media as a source of national brand in changing societies.

We hope that this preliminary discussion will be an inspiration for further investigation and research, in order to explore the question of Turkey's national image in terms of global communication ecology.

## TURKEY'S GLOBAL IMAGE: THE POST-COUP CONFUSION

Ahu Özyurt, Journalist, CNN Türk

Turkey's image has been in trouble for more than two decades. But we have had better times. As a journalist, I do recall the early days of AK Party governments reformist agenda in 2003-2007. We have been observing that gradual change for the worse since the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials and the fake judicial processes.

If you ask to an AK Party sympathizer, they would take the issue to Gezi Park protests. But for the western World, Gezi Park events did not carry a negative statement. A simple and peaceful challenge to the Erdogan government should not have been crushed that badly and probably AK Party's heavyweights realize it by now that it was the Gulenist security apparatchik that pushed things out of control.



For AK Party and Erdogan the violent coup attempt of July 15th carries more significance than anything that can happen under the sun. For our European and American allies this was hard to understand. After all, AK Party and FETO (Gulenist Terror Organisation) were hand in hand up until very recently. It is incredible for lobbyists, congresspeople and even State Department officials to wake up one morning with the news of one arm of Turkish government trying to topple the other.

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But European and American friends have their own share of this crime. Most of them were familiar with the unfair and illegal practices of the Gulenist network. As long as FETO was crippling the Turkish Armed Forces, EU and the US was OK with it. So were AK Party and its government.

So Turkey's global image problem these days stems from the fundamental issue of getting rid of that dilemma. If Gulenists were so bad, why did Erdogan do business with them all along? If not, why are you blaming the entire opposition groups with them?

TASAM is doing a tremendous help to experts to shed light on this huge problem. We, in Turkey believe that we can only solve this problem with more democracy and openness, more freedom for media and NGOs.

So let us start our discussion.

## TURKEY'S IMAGE WILL SUFFER IF FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS CURTAILED

**Francis Ghilès**, Senior Associate Researcher  
Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

Turkey's image in the Global Media is a theme only a fool, or a very brave man, would undertake to discuss, at least in public. I do not consider myself very brave and I hope not to appear foolish. So I will simply try to offer some thoughts on the question. These thoughts are born of four decades of reporting on financial and Mediterranean affairs with a special emphasis on North Africa and a long-standing interest in history. My family has roots in Judaism, Islam and Christianity. Some of you may be aware of the Spanish expression "no hay moros en la costa" (there are no Moors on the coast) a colloquial way of saying there is no danger.

As the West loses the dominance it held over world affairs and the narrative that went with it, as the Middle East descends into bloody mayhem, I doubt whether greater understanding between the Christian and Muslim worlds will prevail. We are fast returning to a world of great power rivalry not just between the West and the broader Middle East where Turkey is a major actor but between the West and the rest of the World, not least Russia and China.

Far from heralding the end of history as presumptuously proclaimed in the early 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet empire, followed a decade later by the US invasion of Iraq and an unprecedented crisis have resulted in the world losing the moorings which had, after 1945, insured thirty years of growth and relative peace. When empires collapse, the result is messy – you in Istanbul are well apprised on what happened after the collapse of the British and French empires are still with us.

At the turn of this century, Europeans woke up to the suction effect of the post-Yugoslav wars of the 1990s but were convinced that such effect could be confined to the relatively manageable Balkan region. Little did they anticipate that state failure, social strife, economic collapse, new forms of terrorism and asymmetrical warfare would stretch in a long arc from Belarus and Ukraine through the Caucasus to the Middle East and from there to African shores of the Mediterranean and across the Sahara desert.

This has greater implications for Turkey and Europe than for the Americans. Both must work hard to ensure that Western policy is not shaped by the US alone. In an ideal world, it would be best if Turkey and Europe took overall charge of their own back-yard but that is scarcely a possibility with regard to the Middle East. But that is not how it has worked out.



Turkey sits on the fault line between Western Europe, Russia, Iran and the Arab world. Hence the needs to play its cards adroitly. Yet the neo-Ottoman policy of no-problems foreign policy constructed a decade ago lies in ruins today. When I first visited Istanbul in 1981, as a Financial Times reporter, Turkey was an island of stability in a sea of troubles though the coup of 1980 suggested something was rotten in the republic built by Kemal Ataturk on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Your country was a NATO stalwart, a potential member of the European Economic Community and it viewed its eastern neighbours with suspicion. Twenty years earlier, it had sided with France against Algeria, a former beylick when the latter bitterly fought for its independence. It was, to be blunt, the Muslim country the West loved to patronise. The land where East meets West and Tradition Modernity offered many clichés. Working for the FT allowed me to scratch beneath the surface. My fascination with your proud history helped me appreciate the complexity of Turkey.

However, beginning this century, with a new political party and a new philosophy Turkey started asking itself: why do we not abandon this cold war mentality? Why not have a zero-problem foreign policy with our neighbours? We may not support Iran but we refuse to see it as a threat. We have Syria on our borders and we need to encourage it to join the modern world. The world of realpolitik has offered a harsh reminder that reengaging with your neighbours when you sit on such fault-lines is not easy.

Turkey is now reengaging with Russia and Iran, two of Syria's key backers which it has tried, ineffectually to topple, since 2011, to the extent of allowing jihadi more than a little freedom until the later, in the form of ISIS conducted two frontal attacks on the state.

Reports on Turkey in the Western media are often harshly critical of Turkey – or to be more precise of the government of Turkey, which is not the same thing. Western media have, to my way of thinking, degenerated in recent decades under the influence of the raucous, racist and inaccurate views beloved of Fox News and Sky News. Muslims of whatever hue have come in for particular venom since 9/11. The war waged by the US on terror has proved to be an utter disaster.

Turkey has been caught up in this brawl, but it is not alone: all Arab countries are suffering as are those among us in the West who try and understand your country and explain its complexity to our readers and those who listen to us on radio or television. Speed of information and the social media have however destroyed quality information and reasoned debate.

Turkish leaders seem to think they alone are victims of a vast plot to sully their name but the Brexit campaign and the current American election offer ample proof of the fact that the greater the lie, the more support it commands; charismatic leaders here as in Russia and indeed in the West hold greater appeal than seriously argued political platforms. I can hardly believe that Queen Elisabeth II has to put up with a buffoon as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The US presidential election is such a sham that the US can hardly offer its model of democracy to anybody in the world. Meanwhile the financial crisis has destroyed the credibility of capitalism. The mismanagement of the EU and the Euro has halted economic growth in Europe, ballooned debt and created millions of unemployed.

If I turn to the Middle East, the consequences of US policy were described as follows in an address last month to the **Committee for the Republic**, by one of the country's most distinguished retired ambassadors, Chas Freeman: "our interventions in the Middle East are the source of much of the corruption of constitutional order in our republic as well as our current economic malaise. These interventions have produced ruinous levels of debt, enriched a few but impoverished many of us, and made us even less secure."

He added that "region-wide enmity to Israel is still a factor in terrorist attacks on Americans, but now it's overshadowed by blowback from direct interventions in the Islamic world: Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia and Syria. These interventions have thrust much of the region into anarchy and directly or indirectly killed at least 1.3m people and perhaps as many as 2m Muslims so far this century.....Invasions, drone warfare, assassinations, extraordinary rendition, torture and the arming of insurgents against established governments and populations are widely regarded abroad as constituting state terrorism".

The 'global war on terrorism' has ironically become the greatest stimulus to the spread and growth of anti-American terrorism". The financial cost of the wars to the US alone (not counting spending by Iraq, Pakistan and Afghanistan) is at least \$4.8 trillion to date; future cumulative interest payments on past appropriations in 2001-2013 are estimated at another \$8 trillion by 20153, figures which underestimate the real costs. Two years ago, Lord Lothian in London echoed these conclusions in a remarkable note on **How the West Lost the Middle East**. These senior officials or politicians are not alone in taking their government to task for the policies they conduct. For all its faults and attempts to manipulate the media, which work up to a point, Western governments do not imprison journalists and dismiss academics from their chairs. It does not close down TV stations and newspapers overnight.

Many western journalists are serious in their endeavour to understand Turkey. They are working in a very turbulent world where both your country, its neighbours, indeed the whole world is changing fast. The freedom of journalists, however raucous and ill intentioned their articles or broadcasts may be, is essential. I had my fair share of threats and pressures when I covered the civil war in Algeria in the 1990s. But I stood my ground. I respect Algeria deeply but that never made me bow to threats.

There can be no single interpretation for what is going on in Turkey today, events flow too fast, and they are simply too complex and chaotic. Am I ill intentioned if I wonder whether recent





events have not weakened the military and political intelligence of this country? Am I part of an international plot if I ask whether the immune system of a NATO country gives the impression of slipping away from its moorings into the chaos of the Middle East? Am I not allowed to wonder whether Turkey can continue fighting simultaneously against the Gülenists, ISIS and the Kurdish insurgency that reignited last year especially if Ankara keeps colliding with its Western allies?

Can I not try and understand whether the country's foreign policy is hostage to domestic issues and seeking to gain tactical advantage rather than work along strategic lines?

Is it treasonable to point out, as Dani Rodrik, Professor of International Political Economy at Harvard does on his blog **Erdogan's Tragic Choice** that "the ultimate irony of July's failed coup is that it was engineered not by Turkey's secularists, but by Gülenist officers Erdogan had allowed to be promoted in their stead"? The Gülenists give me the impression of a Jesuit approach to education but their taste in transparency is more Opus Dei. Their fight with AKP reminds me of the bitter feud between Trotskysts and Stalinists after 1918.

Why does a leader fail to use his vast popularity to restore the rule of law – and that, for me as a journalist, means the freedom to speak and publish, rather than undermine it? To ask whether moderation and reconciliation would not serve Turkey's interest better is not to partake in some baroque Orientalist plot. Turkey's image in the Western media would be helped if the country's press, TV stations and academia were left to debate freely the complex challenges it faces today. Your country has elites, not least intellectual, which it should be proud of, it had made immense economic strides since I first visited 35 years ago and Istiklal Caddesi – where public lighting was dim, was deserted as soon as night fell.

Turkey is not alone in seeing itself as the victim of a plot, just listen to Donald Trump who would want us believe the US presidential election results might be rigged. When leaders resort to paranoia, the results can never be happy. Why copy Donald Trump or that former journalist who parades as the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom? Surely the West has better models to offer.

## HOW HAS TURKEY'S IMAGE BEEN MOLDED IN THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT MAY WE EXPECT TO SEE GOING FORWARD

Jason Epstein, President, Southfive Strategies

Good afternoon.

I would like to thank TASAM's Political Communication Institute for inviting me to talk with you today. My name is Jason Epstein.

Yes, I am an American. No, I can't tell you with any certainty who will be the next President of the United States.

But I am happy to be back in Istanbul — although truthfully, as a baseball fan — there's really no place I would rather be than in the city of Chicago, where Cubs fans are at this very moment out in the streets celebrating their first World Series championship in well over a century, having defeated the team from Cleveland that last won a title in 1948.

As a Boston Globe reporter observed:

"Most Americans want neither of these teams to lose. Most Americans want neither of these presidential candidates [Clinton or Trump] to win."

Tomorrow I depart for Florida, where I will participate in the final 72 hours of an important statewide political contest.

But today I am here to comment about Turkey's Global Image in 2016 but, way more specifically, about the image of the Turkish Republic back in the States. My thoughts are a consequence of spending several years lending a hand in the execution of Ankara's public relations activities in the United States and remaining engaged in the topic in subsequent years.

The goal here is to look back on the past quarter-century and then offer a thought or two on what might be achieved in the months and years to come. Interestingly, there is little formal analysis of this topic, at least in English, whereas there has been no shortage of data and accompanying debate on how Turks view Americans.

Other than a stretch of time encompassing less than a decade, Turkey has had image challenges in America, partly a byproduct of its designed inwardness, partly by its vocal detractors, and partly by a feature film about the misfortunes of a would-be drug smuggler. Those with explicitly positive views may have thought about Turkey's important contributions during the





Korean War and the friendliness encountered when visiting the country.

My first exposure to Turkey came as a graduating senior at the State University of New York at Albany a quarter-century ago, when President Özal accepted the school's request to deliver the commencement address. Greek nationalists protested the decision but he spoke to us anyway. In 1991, Turkey was very much an unknown country to most Americans, other than what they had remembered from Oliver Stone's 1977 film, "Midnight Express."

Six years later, as a professional, I left my job on Capitol Hill as a congressional staffer to join a Jewish non-governmental organization. Within weeks, I was meeting with diplomats from the Turkish Embassy. We discussed the strengthening trilateral relationship between the United States, Turkey, and Israel, as well as the closer relations between these three nations and former Soviet republics, such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan.

And yet, Turkey was still pretty much a mystery. Even in Washington, DC, it seemed more likely that the first impression of Turkey from the average man or woman in government was from "Midnight Express." And of course, those who knew a bit more seemed to receive their knowledge from the Greek nationalists or now the Armenian diaspora.

Moving on to the winter of 2003. I had just started my own company and soon after became a member of the Turkish Embassy's public relations team. Right away, we were reaching out to journalists to communicate the concerns of the *Dişişleri* on the potential US-led invasion of Iraq.

As you may recall, the new AKP government, led by Prime Minister Gül, was quite wary of a military campaign to oust Saddam Hussein but not firmly opposed either. At first, US-based reporters and columnists needed to be prodded to cover the issue. They didn't seem to understand that Ankara was not in lock step with Washington. Not until the historic vote in the parliament on the 1st of March against allowing coalition forces to attack from Turkish soil did they take note. And from that point on, the media started investing time in the subject matter. Erdogan was now prime minister, Gül was foreign minister and then president, and Turkey's ambitious global outreach, combined with a growing diverse economy, made it a hot commodity. Tourism campaigns flourished.

In Washington, the number of think tank scholars and events covering Turkey seemed to grow exponentially. Members of the media, policymakers, and lawmakers alike were anxious to visit. There was confidence that EU membership was just over the horizon and the possibility of being a model for other Muslim-majority countries, particularly those in the Arab world, to follow. Despite the sting of being rebuked on the eve of the Iraq war, George W. Bush's administration heaped considerable praise upon Turkey and its leader.

“Turkey’s democracy is an important example for the people in the broader Middle East, and I want to thank you for your leadership,” Bush expressed to Erdogan in a White House meeting in 2005. He thanked the prime minister for contributions to building democracy and security in Afghanistan and working with the Palestinians to build an independent state.

The warm feelings continued after Barack Obama succeeded Bush, crystallized when in January 2012, he included Erdogan as one of five heads of government with whom he felt particularly close. Of course, even during this period several rough patches were encountered. One example was the seemingly non-stop battle in media and the halls of Congress with Armenian groups over the horrific events of 1915 and the “G” word.



Another was the deterioration of ties between Turkey and Israel, first reaching a crisis point in Davos in January 2009 and then of course in the wake of the Mavi Marmara incident the following year. A third would be the sympathy the American public felt for the Gezi Park protesters combined with shock at the growing number of journalists who were imprisoned. (Unfortunately, that number continues to grow). In my role as a consultant during AKP’s first term in power, however, I must say that the fallout from the 2006 cinematic installment of the “Valley



of the Wolves” was probably the toughest moment for our PR team. Interestingly, it didn’t start out that way.

Some here may remember that, one year earlier, Gül had complained to visiting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice about American television series and films spreading anti-Turkish sentiments, In response, Rice noted that the administration had no influence over Hollywood and, if it had, would the Bush administration really have permitted left-wing activist Michael Moore to release his “Fahrenheit 9/11” documentary?

So, when “Kurtlar Vadisi: Irak” came under fire for its perceived anti-American and anti-Semitic message, the ambassador responded that, as with programming in the States, this was not a Turkish government production and therefore didn’t reflect its views. When the parliamentary speaker days later proudly described the film as “absolutely magnificent,” however, we knew the embassy had lost his protective shield.

Earlier, I mentioned that the vast majority of data regarding Americans, Turks, and perceptions focuses on how Turks see Americans, not the other way around. The same is not true with Israel. One pollster, Gallup, regularly asks respondents about their perceptions of Israel and the Palestinians. However, I found of particular interest a national survey of more than 2,000 registered voters conducted in the middle of 2015 by an advocacy group promoting strong ties between Washington and Jerusalem, because, among other things, it wanted to dig deeper — to learn what pro-Israel messages resonated with the American public.

The data clearly showed that the strategic nature of the bilateral relationship, namely “Israel is our most important ally in the Middle East,” and Israel being viewed as on the front lines against terror groups are considerably stronger arguments than talking about shared values and working for peace.

While there was some demographic variation between frontline/shared values, “working for peace” ranked very low across all tested groups. Also, faring poorly were the following messages: “God gave the land to the Jews who had lived there for thousands of years,” Israel is a leader in high tech and renewable energy, strengthening the American economy,” and “Israel is an economic partner of the United States, helping to create American jobs.”

By the way, this pollster did include a favorability/unfavorability question about Turkey and found a 28/41 split — that is, 28 percent favorable. And while that number may sound low compared to Israel’s 52/31 split, note that Turkey scored higher than the other regional actors, including the Palestinian Authority, Qatar, and of course, Iran. Additionally, approximately one-third offered no opinion, demonstrating that, unlike the PA and the Iranian regime, many Americans still feel they don’t know enough about Turkey.



I bring up this survey because it's worth wondering whether Turkey can learn anything useful from the survey questions dealing with the reasons why Americans back Israel. I suspect the answer is yes. So, while it's fruitless to persuade an American public that passionately support First Amendment press freedom that acute security concerns necessitate the detention of numerous journalists, why not devote resources emphasizing that, as with Israel, Turkey remains a critical ally of the United States in this chaos-infested region and continues to do battle with some of the world's worst terrorists?

I concede that perhaps now isn't the right time to make this a priority. Relations with the outgoing Obama administration are now frosty, for which both sides deserve ample blame, while ties with Russia have improved. Recent events in Turkey — among other things, a state of emergency in place since the coup attempt and a southern border that's aflame — show that attention is elsewhere.

However, there will be a new occupant of the White House in less than three months — either Hillary Clinton or Donald Trump — and the tense environment in Turkey may ease somewhat over time. As the next administration settles in, and as a new US foreign policy gets formulated, the new public relations strategy should be teed up and ready to go.

Thank you.

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## THE JULY 15 ATTEMPTED COUP AND NEWS-FRAMES

Emer. Prof. Dr. Haluk Şahin, İstanbul Bilgi University

The events of July 15th, the attempted coup d'état, caught most people by surprise – journalists included, both domestic and foreign. This was evident in the coverage they provided. Especially the performance of the Western media came under a great deal of criticism here in Turkey. Turks with very different political and ideological orientations converged in criticizing the Western media outlets for the poor job they did in telling their audiences about what was really going on. There was a widespread feeling that the Western media:

- a) Underreported this very significant event by not devoting enough space to it
- b) Misreported it by focusing on what the government did at the expense of what the people did in the streets
- c) Distorted it by not giving much attention to the involvement of Gülenists.

For instance two columnists writing for the pro-government newspaper Daily Sabah reflected some of these criticisms:

“All in all, Western media coverage of the attempted coup was less than helpful and indeed, debilitating, as it mostly focused its attention on the Turkish government and the President rather than putschists. The bravery of the people who took to the streets in protest of the coup at the risk of losing their lives was an epic success for democracy and should have received due respect and acknowledgement in the Western media.” (İbrahim Efe-Osman Ülker, August 9, 2016)

As a long-time observer of the foreign media's coverage of Turkey, I found myself in general agreement with these assessments. I, however, disagree with some of the reasons offered as being behind this poor performance. I will try to explain here that the reasons are more complex than identified.

Most explanations put forward by the pro-government media were of a conspiratorial nature. Many of them presented the coup-attempt as the final episode of a grand conspiracy against Turkey and its “independent-minded leader”, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

The media behaviour was a part of it – they had been instructed to behave that way by whoever was behind the it all, they said: “The supreme-intelligence”, “the Zionist circles”, “the crusading mentality”, and number of other Western suspects “envious of Turkey's emergence



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as an economic power". But the chief culprit, the one most overtly condemned, was the United States, the puppet master of Fethullah Gülen whom it has been protecting for a long time.

These conspiratorial explanations, as interesting as they might be, fell short of being convincing on a number of points, especially for those who are familiar with the way the Western media operates. The vulgar "command-and-cover" approach to the Western media is obviously too simplistic; the causes of Western media's attitudes to Turkey and its current government should be sought in deeper layers. As for day-to-day journalistic practices, we may gain an insight by applying what we call in news research, "frame analysis." This approach acknowledges that news is not a direct reflection of events but a socially and institutionally manufactured product open to a variety of influences. These external influences are kept under control by certain mechanisms of professionalism.

Naturally, what I am describing here is true for democratic societies with a competitive media, and not authoritarian systems where news, like most other things, is defined and dictated from the top. In other words, in democratic societies, and here we are talking about the Western countries known as democracies, basic news decisions are not dictated by governments, but by professionals who are acting according to a set of canons and traditions. This should hold true for the coverage of July 15<sup>th</sup> events as well.

I don't want to be misunderstood or blamed of being naive at this point. I have been in the



news business too long not to know that in certain countries at certain periods the relations between governments and the media can be too close for comfort from the democratic viewpoint. “Liaisons dangereuses” do occur. But on the whole, in most stories we read or watch, basic decisions are made by media professionals. The final output is a lot more likely to be a product of reporters and editors acting as journalists rather than government officials acting as conspiracy implementers.

Which is not to say that these stories are not predictable of predetermined to some extent. They are. We can predict with high accuracy how the press of a certain country is likely to cover the events is a certain country at a given period of time. This is where the concept of news frames become useful. Much of the time, not the government, or the adviser, or the owner tells journalists how they should cover a certain story. New frames do. Or rather, dominant new frames do. So, in order to understand why a particular story is covered in a certain way we need to discover and analyze the news frame in which it is presented.

So what is a news frame? A news-frame is a ready-made box or tray into which the elements of the story are placed so that they can become meaningful as an ensemble. The world is too complicated and confusing – so instead of treating each event as unique, we look at them an instance of a set. It is usually presented in a narrative form as narratives are easier to understand and remember. Frames help us see some things and not see others. When we go to another country we go with a frame in our minds and see things accordingly. The foreign journalist comes to Turkey expecting to see certain things. Let us say, the dominant frame is “Turkey is a country where the forces of secularism and the forces of political Islam are locked in a fierce battle,” what does he/she see? What kind of pictures does he/she take? What kind of questions does he/she ask? Probably those that conform to the dominant frame. Out-of-frame stories are difficult to sell not only to the readers, but to the editors as well. Dominant frames can be very powerful at a subconscious level!

Of course, like all things in life, news frames are not eternal. They change over time. The change is usually gradual and may take a long time. But, in times of upheavals, they can change rapidly, sometimes almost instantly. So, we ask students of news to identify the time of the frame shift. How and why did the old frame weaken? How did it change? And why? What has taken its place?

Now, with this conceptual background we can look at July 15th as an incident bringing about a frame-shift about Turkey. What was the dominant frame before? We can discern two dominant frames during the 15 years of AKP rule extending from 2002 to 2016.

From 2002 to 2013 the AKP and its leaders benefited from a tremendously positive dominant frame. That frame could be summarized as follows: “In Turkey, good Moslem democrats are pushing out the bad secularist autocrats.” What they meant by the bad secularist autocrats was principally the Army and the Kemalists. Stories coming out of Turkey that did not go along





with this dominant frame were ignored or minimized. Turkey was presented as a model for other countries in the region proving that democracy and Islam could co-exist successfully.

When the circumstances began to change after 2007, when journalists were put in jail and thousands of people began to be arrested for murky reasons, the opposition parties and press associations had a hard time to attract attention in the foreign media. They were dismissed as remnants of the “old autocratic, army dominated regime.”

It is always difficult to register things that contradict the dominant frame. They just don't show up. This positive frame which blacked out most controversial developments in the country began to change in 2013. Gezi protests were one of the reasons. It was a picturesque affair. Hundreds of foreign journalists came to Turkey and had a chance to speak to their colleagues directly. They began to question the old frame. Turkey was not a democratic garden of roses after all. The “good Moslem democrats” of yore were doing “bad things” to people asking for more freedom. So a new frame began to take shape. And over time, it became the new dominant frame. It can be summarized as: “The bad Moslem autocrats are trying to suppress the good forces of democracy.”

Now they began looking for pictures and stories corroborating this new frame. It was the turn of the pro-AKP press and party supporters to become frustrated with the “negative” coverage. The Western press was turning a blind eye and a deaf ear to their side of the story while opening their pages and screens to forces of “division and evil.” They began to explain it terms of a conspiracy because conspiracy theories are the easiest way out since they cannot be neither proven nor disproven.

15<sup>th</sup> of July events were automatically perceived within the new dominant frame. It took the foreign media a little while before they realized that, again something different, “out of the frame”, had happened in Turkey. The old frame was inadequate and had to be replaced. The “Moslem autocrats” were not fighting against the forces of democracy this time, but against evil coup-plotters of mysterious connections. There was obviously a lack of information about the Gülen movement. (Why was that? This case deserves separate study.)

Weren't they partners of the “good Moslem democrats” during the period of the positive frame? What had changed? Who were they anyway? There was a lot of confusion for a few days, which began to lift after the massive Yenikapı rally that included the leaders of the opposition in a show of national unity. This was the crucial period of “tabula rasa” when a new positive frame could have been constructed. But for a number reasons, that did not happen.

Frame-shifting and new frame building are communication issues that deserve closer attention not only by communication experts but also by diplomats and policy makers in these turbulent times. Explaining away complex events by means of fantastic conspiracy theories are poor policy guides.

## TURKEY AND THE CRISES OF TRANSITION. CHALLENGES AND CHANCES OF MEDIA: TURKEY AS IT SEEMS TO BE

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It's obvious, Turkey has come into waters of huge crisis, as a society as well as a nation and as a country. The reasons are manifold and do not just lie in history or in religion and its contradictory interpretation. They also can be stated in cultural contexts of societal (media-) communication, of acting and reacting in politics, and, of course, of social change. Social change, in sociological context is understood as a phenomenon of alteration of models and of paradigms of social relation (cf. Hall 1975, Giddens 1990): social change is not something that happens first on levels of structures. It happens as cultural performance and signifies mostly unexpected changes that a society experiences in its social and cultural structures. In context of international relations and media-communication it might be interesting to observe, how other societies react socially and politically. The forms of reaction result in a mirror of and for identity building absorbing all open stated or hidden valuations and thus create images with more or less far reaching or deep rooting prejudices. Has mutual observation once come to that level of communication, especially the international one or any communication across borders of culture, religion or ideology, then it is either difficult to find a balanced sphere of mutual understanding as well as to overcome the crises, unless there is an intervention of and for meta-communication: creating a discursive zone in which there is place for time, motifs, and interest to talk about, how to find a new level and a less uploaded bridge of inter-communication. Exactly that is what Turkey needs now. The scientific analysis, as a third partner, providing a mirror and a folia of and for reflection, can build such bridges of meta-communication.

Considering Turkey as a society in a media-related transition modus (cf. Thomaß 2001, 2003)

- as a close meshed connected society characterised by a strong will of idiosyncrasy, of singularity, of, authenticity, of originality and of sovereignty,
- a country, being in transition uploaded with remarkable energy of social, economic and political movement,
- a society being in severe transition, founded and deathlessly accompanied by the dispute between secularism (Kemalism) and confessionalism (Islamism), and somehow enforced and pressed by EU not really helping Turkish people to make the process of transition (again) their own and a factor of their self-reliability,



- now, at the end of 2016 getting more and more surprised over the tendencies to overdraw the interpretation of self-relation and self-reliance as expressed in governmental statements (PM Binali Yildirim) like: “we don’t need your advice, we don’t need your criticism”, or: “we are not interested in your red line....” That overdrawn communication shows that there are paramount outstanding topics blocking the view for substantial issues.

### The Sources of Images and Security

What is then the impact of images and what is the result of a general observation? All what we know and also knew from Turkey, we know from media and media-typical communication (cf. Luhmann 2004). Even personal experiences interfered by use of media. That is the reason, why it makes sense to reflect about the role of media in order to understand better, what is the sediment of such media-directed communication. In the interest of knowing, where the images arise and evolve from, it is not appropriate or not important to ask for effects of media and what media does with audience. It is much more important to ask for gratification of media attendance (LaRose / Eastin 2010) and to consider what does people (the audience) with media in order to know what it should be aware of and think and talk about? In context of media research the whole complex has been researched and reflected in frame of the Agenda-Setting-Theory (Weaver / McCombs / Shaw 1998) and of the Social Cognitive Theory (Bandura 2002), in general through a far-reaching theory of media attendance, saying: the agenda of the audience determines or mirrors the agenda of media attendance as well as people always uses or consume media – mutatis, mutandis - in correlation to their context of life (context theory). That means: The social and societal environment is supposed to be the condition of the selective program of media attendance, not vice versa.

Following that, images are not produced by media, but they are (re-)generated (controlled or mirrored) through a selective use of media – last but not least in the interest of gaining security against a sphere of anxiety.

The use-and-gratification theorem of media usage (Katz in McQuail 2010: 430 ff.) says clearly: people uses selectively information and news in order to avoid complexity, surprise, confusion, problems etc. that means: people, especially when not trained or formed in education, critical reflection, and media literacy, uses information and news in order to affirm yet existing attitudes or to agree and concord with those opinions from which they think they would be compatible to the cultural attitudes of their reference group.

In a mediological understanding, images, devolved in context of media attendance, are related to the (desire of) security as far as security is a public value to be provided from public as well as from private institutions through their communication and through their management as far as they are dealing with public matters. Now end of 2016, with the attempted coup of 15 July and with the follow-up reaction the state and the framework of security (public feel-

ing, collective behaviour) has dramatically changed. In such a climate terrorist attacks unfold and double increased effect, to the advantage of the interests of terrorist activities for public effects (media effect) as well as over the expectations on public liability in the field of security management. Security as a public value has to be provided from public as well as from private institutions. In order that the issue does not turn to become one from public against private life, the involving of the civil society in the management of security is decisive, since their organizations are dealing with public matters and public goods.

Communication (information) is such a – if not: the public good of society referring to the notion that the society is, what its communication is like (cf. Bauer 2014). That means: media as an infrastructural environment of societal communication, media - public or private – is expected and challenged to serve and to take care of security as a valuable concept of a meaningful and mindful societal life. Media in that context is to be valued as a dispositive of social (public) trust. The social mechanism of trust (cf. Luhmann 1968) is not something just to produce (using media as tools for power and influence), but is rather an implicit quality factor of communication and of use of media.





Connected to the complex relationship of security through media and the social mechanism of trust is the factor of complexity. Complexity is the reference-experience of uncertainty and because of that a point to focus on when talking about concepts of security. In complex uploaded situation, just like through and after the putsch - it might be the reaction of public administration or the intention of political leadership to decrease the public complexity perception by trimming back the sources (media) of differentiation, of plurality and of diversity of opinion. Such activities might be a factor of advantage in the interests of the administration or of leadership, but has confusing effects among the (media using) population just because of the fact that people loses options of comparison for building images of trust. The social mechanism of trust, restricted and limited to one voice (just sources, channels, media, papers that are sanctioned by one leader, one party, one governmental umbrella of opinion building and moreover interpreted and executed under jurisdiction) gets reduced to a question and decision of obedience, not to one of trust (cf.. According to group-dynamic and socio-psychological findings (cf. Hofstätter 1986, Schwarz 2010), the social-practical effect must be that people unlearns to trust each another, learns to suspect any next one to deviate from predetermined and as such even sanctioned and jurisdictionally directed (public) opinion (cf. Adorno 1950, Rokeach 1970). As this becomes a public climate, people would start to prevent themselves individually and would unlearn to say what they think and increasingly abstain from their convictions, regardless what party they would be associated with. Mistrust is a totalitarian feeling, destroys any inspirational source of social life, the motivation of creativity, and the conditions truthfulness and credibility. People would sidestep to hidden ways of communication, in context of media: to a cocooning form of use of social media.

### **The Impact of Transition**

Analysing the impact of media to the image of a society of a country in international context always demands to consider the conditions of accessibility of information and investing for journalists as well as to be aware for the social, political, cultural, and symbolic environments the journalist are living with.

In regard to this mutually influencing relationship of those two factors there has always been the temptation of sociological analysis to describe the structural connectivity mostly through figures, dates and facts in order to interpret the conditions of power.

Those descriptions and analyses follow the idea that quantities assert and reveal connections, causalities and correlations. Maybe they do. But they do it under the condition of a culturally (meaningful) hidden premise: any consideration is a cultural approximation to a phenomenon and is done in the interest of affirmation of culturally mandatory horizons. That's the reason why the scientific description of any considerable correlation demands the declaration of the





interest of enlightenment: so ever the description of albeit structural phenomena is a cultural narration on the basis of interpreting consideration.

This initial deliberation, done in respect to challenging conditions for media development in countries of modern transition (cf. Giddens 1990), which Turkey is in many aspects, incites to focus immediately on culture, particularly on journalistic culture as a hybrid world, where political events, gestures, attitudes, patterns, and values meet public observation, and public observation come across system structures and political conditions. Out of respect to that starting position it does not make so much sense to re-analyse the structures (e.g. organizational structures of media, program output, organizational input, law, legislation, economical situation etc.) but would give much more insight and understanding (in the sense of applied social studies) to focus on cultural components of the media culture in transition society of Turkey (cf. Offe.1994) The reason is: The challenging conditions for media development in pre-modern societies is not the development or the establishment of all the structures that are indispensable for the organization of democracy, but understand and them as models of culture and mind. There are enough sources and resources : knowledge, experience, external support and possibilities. The main question is how the administration, organizations, institutions, media companies, and the public opinion deal carefully with all those structural conditions. The same interpretation counts for journalism education. The challenging conditions, since they are cultural ones, do not touch the possibilities of developing structures for educational systems in democracy-minded countries. It would not be a problem to overtake or to copy successful systems from all over Europe or from somewhere else. But there is the demand of an authentic way of democratization, which is not to copy others, but to find formats of public communication and/or of media programs that respect the cultural roots of the society as well as the ethical norms of an enlightened society.

It is the cultural rationality of communication that serves as the source (reservoir of diversity) to manage conflicts and crises. That seems generally to be an important point of reference in handling transition and dealing with the multiplex conflicts within and between the country's political interests. Crises usually come up in processes, when it is not clear enough which criteria are the deciding lines to be followed, - often when there are different interests to be realized or to be served. In that situation it is helpful to have a background-culture which is wider and in its leading criteria more integrative than the actual interests. There is no other legitimized direction for operation of communication potentials in case of conflict and crisis but the cultural programs, which keeps the archive of values of mutual understanding. But it works only, if it is in general use. Culture, which is not in everyday use is not culture, it is just a decoration in case of need. A decoration, taken in service in the case of need, does not represent enough depth, not enough credibility, not enough objectivity, in order to compensate uncertainty.



Crises are deployments (Foucault 1988) of communication. They depict, what communication is like: a re-construction of sense, negotiated by exchange of information and by sharing a decision. This is not a mechanism which just has to be brought on its way, it is a subjective performance of competence in differentiation and decision, of being able to pay attention to the other out of a clear (and transparent) own position. The panic, which often comes up in critical or decisive situations, often happens because of the fact, that the hidden interest or hidden agenda is not compatible to the cultural background or is somehow a separated interpretation of a common cultural program. Decisive communication demands cultural background and only gets solved in relation to a common cultural program. Communication competence in situations like that is cultural competence: ability, preparedness, authority, and responsibility to decide the performance (rhetoric) of communication and to balance the options both of common sense of cultural behaviour and of challenge of overcoming the crisis by authentic expression of critical situation. The cultural rationality of communication is to decide to pay attention to crises, to challenges, and to complexity a position (performance) of **communication** in order to get aware of differentiation and to open the perspective for other interpretations of facts and opinions.

### The Frames of Leadership and Trust

Leadership is an important category of public trust. It is not only a quality characteristic of a person. In the context of media communication, leadership is a quality of social, managerial, and governmental performance in relation to what media is interested to observe and to what people expects. The image of leadership that is shared by media, could be called “public leadership”, saying: What people get to know, to think and to feel about political leadership is not a result of personal experience being observers of what is going on. The media-using population just observes how events are reported and interpreted in media (cf. Hallin / Mancini 2004). And, even more: they select those news, comments and opinion according to their interests and pre-attitudes shaped within the framework of socio-cultural context of living. The expectation of people observing political governance and leadership, of course, is closely related to its specific social culture, mentality and environmental conditioning. Family-structured societies (cf. Taylor: 2002) as Turkey in general is meant to represent, are declined to perform leadership in charismatic father-figures as they are supposed to re-call the “archetypus” (Jung 1935/1995 § 5) of an ever-taking care father, especially in times of turbulence and crisis. Such a figure occasionally earns not just trust because of special competences or achievements, but ostentatious demonstration of trust and unconditioned obedience. Political demonstrations for (and even with) the Turkish conduct in Austria and Germany during the presidential election campaign and in the wake of the attempted coup in July 2016 have shown that phenomenon impressively.

European countries, in so far as they appear more as (so to call) next-to-next societies, are about to get surprised and even to get scared of such societal and political concepts of use of authority thinking that those concepts would lead back to times that are supposed to be overborne over long historical processes of democratization and civil-society development. The Turkey-internal reaction in media has been and is ambivalent: the media endorsement of the changeover to a presidential system matches with clear decline, although less loudly expressed. The reaction in media outside of Turkey is sorrow-stricken observing signals of the implementation of an authoritarian regime.

Observing the facts and the public reactions to the facts a politological analysis would come to the conclusion that the socio-cultural programs and the socially deeply rooted paradigms of trust in a media environmental performance get even intensified since the mechanisms of prejudice and the ambivalent stereotypes are used as compensative factors of a non-verifiable knowledge on any kind of (especially ethnic) otherness (cf Lippmann 1922, Petersen / Six 2008).

As far as people is depending from a climate of trust in media (public communication management), it is indispensable to prevent and to protect media as source of credibility. Trust always is an investment of risk (Luhmann 1968), but is also the habit to share or to delegate responsibility to persons or to systems that are supposed to own the competence – meaning: ability, capacity, knowledge, and responsibility for reasonability of thinking and acting. In all advanced societies, especially in a media society media are meant to be such systems.

That's why it is so important to provide all the conditions they need in order to be able to fulfill that expectation: quality, professionalism, independence, freedom. All models of personalization in the context of political (media) communication (one leader, one voice, one opinion), especially if they are supposed to represent a concept of charismatic leadership, are in danger to turn out as contra-productive in relation and in comparison to the empowerment of democratization of a society. Democracy, built on rights and obligations as well as on responsibility and participation needs the mechanism of social and mutual trust as the quality of social practice (cf. Pelinka 1974). In case this quality gets discredited, togetherness of the people becomes a source of suffering of weakness instead of benefiting from mutual empowerment.

Personalized leadership might be a technically effective model of distribution of power in state of pioneer or in case of crises, but implicates the tendency of isolating the centre of power from the peripheries onto a state where a system, a society or an organisation long ago should have reached the phase of consolidation of a balanced distribution of power and responsibility. Or to say it the other way round: strong charismatic and personalized leadership concepts deduce potentates and rulers to a kind of identification of person and power, so that a kind of distribution (democratization) of power might not really reach a socio-integrative form of fluent circulation (cf. Hackmann / Craig 2000: 33 ff.).





A concentration of political authority, as well as the accumulation of power potentials at the level of elites, then affirmed and mirrored by to a large extent synchronized media, would create a climate of self-control and self-censorship inside the country, would lens out the political discourse, would establish psychological and structural conditions of biased news-reporting, and would seriously weaken the structures of civil society (cf. Nolte 1971). Different-minded groupings, anyway more or less discriminated, just stick in forms of protest not having any other chance to realize their interest of societal or political participation. Once pushed aside, especially when decreed in context of exercise of an office, they are reduced to stand out as trouble-makers and to attract attention by active disturbance, knowing that public attention is the currency in a media society (cf. Franck 1998).

### **Challenge of Changes in Theoretical Concepts of Journalism**

The current development in theoretical conception of media communication does not refer so much to the structures. The matter of analysis becomes more and more the cultural meaning of structures (Bauer 2000). Therefore-searching for the impact of social conditions to the development of media and news journalism - it has to be the intention to draw the attention to a theoretical perspective of communication and of media communication that may shoot new light on journalism, both in practice and in education (cf. Kopper / Mancini 2003, Bohrman / Klaus / Machil 2007). is an organizational system that reflects in its traditional theory and practice and in its education a concept of consensual communication. That concept constructs communication as an exchange of meaning, based on objective information that aims to select out all possible differences of meaning the facts (information), thus coming to a homogenized and closed content of equal understanding (meaning). Consensus then (or at least a compromise of optimization) is the (normative) factor of building communities for society. In media context, consensus is taken as the paradigm of public sphere, which also is (normatively) conceptualized as an as far as possible homogenized system of sharing (common) meanings. The aspiration of commonality may be taken as an indication of the desire of mutual exculpation of complexity, of contingency and of uncertainty. Commonality is a kind of control. If that is what makes journalism being the professionally organized platform of public communication culture then journalism becomes the projection screen of desire for certainty and public trust.

Living with and within a communication (media) society means that we understand our societal environment through the code of media and through the reasonability of media (reduction of complexity, public attention, stress of publicity, standardisation of content, passage of meaning and relevance). It means that we have a media-made image of the societal (political, cultural and symbolic) environment. And it means that the axes of building knowledge about

others and about oneself (identity) are no longer taken from national borders, from institutional rules, from rituals of families or from predictions of the milieu one is living with, but much more from flexible and often changing frames of reference: communication systems and media. So we learn to control loss of competence by keeping contact to media. Media is the communicational system of generalisation of rules what is to know in order to keep in touch with the societal environment.

The social (and societal) environment, since it is represented by far through media and since media are as an economical good an object (and as public means of communication a carrier of) of globalization, the societal (organizational, social, cultural, symbolic) environment becomes more and more globalized. It becomes more and more culturally stirred and hybrid.

Globalization is a factor in global development and social change that effects and influences very much the concepts of cultural neighbourhood all over the world. This factor is easy to be named, but difficult to be brought into a comprehensive model, since it contains a mixture of experiences and notions and myths. It needs a blanket and theoretically far in depth going analysis of the complex phenomenon, summarized by the term of globalization, in order to convince that this process cannot be just valued between the antagonism of good and bad. In reality globalization is not just a process being observed, but it is a concept that deals with the conception of man in an environment of modernity and of modernization (Charalambis 2004). It is a process of a universal social change that is culturally natural and necessary and that necessarily provokes changes, even in form of contradictions.

Globalization is a process with wide ranging propositions and effects in streamlining the economical and organizational systems in order to achieve transmissibility and penetrability of markets, meanwhile with strong ties and deeply anchored structures of interchange and interdependency. It really cannot be surprising that the economical process converges with cultural ones – especially in media environment - since the cultural (also media) changes express themselves economically.

Culture, taken by itself, is a system of meaning, socially structured, that directs the execution of everyday life and contains frames of reference for identity, belongingness and normative orientation. Culture steers the everyday use of values. It is a cybernetic circle that reflects itself, also by reflecting other cultures somehow in a way of “for meanings” (Barker 200, Hepp 2002, 857). The production of cultural goods emerges from the need of self-representation and representation against others. This process claims territories (nations, communities, societies) and stresses borders between one and the other. It is exactly this quality of segregation through cultural borders, what gets criticized by theoretical concepts of intercultural communication (Hepp 2002: 29).



### **The Culture of Security: Public Management of Diversity and Plurality**

In a media- and communication society, the public sphere of security is not and cannot be result of unity or uniform. The challenge is to understand diversity, variety and difference as cultural sources of social security and trust. In order to explain, what is or what could be the culture of diversity it needs to decide for a frame of reference, which has significance and relevance for the problem we are talking about.

This is a very simple requirement, otherwise it would not be possible, at least not politically sincere to argue for certain measures how to develop or how to establish culture of diversity – not to speak about the necessity to answer honestly the question, why is there a need of cultivating diversity? Obviously, the term of diversity becomes a paradigmatic position in understanding and explaining the challenges and the chances of social togetherness; it becomes even a cultural and political term and gets used in contexts of conceptualizing new horizons of building society and cultural citizenship (cf. / Lüneborg 2004). There is no other most enlightening concept of reference than the one of communication. Because communication is the instance to unify difference and to make diversity understood as a source of culture (Bauer 2006: 242).

Generally spoken culture is a social practice in generating meaning and in referring to generalized meaning, it is the social constructive expression of a socially and collectively developed program on values and orientations of sense, which fulfill the notion of an “own territory”, of identity and togetherness of all people experiencing itself being connected by that program (cf. Schmidt 2004) in significant media: language, common social institutions, common history, common narrations, common traditions. In this interpretation culture always may be taken as a framework and legitimacy and justification of social control.

But: Origin is not the only point of reference for a definition of culture (and here already an open-minded theory of culture needs to break the routine of everyday use of the category) but also: ideas of never realized notions, horizons and room to move, options of being otherwise, and future. Thus, besides through a repeating use (which also is a way of changing it - mimetic aspect (cf. Gebauer/Wulf 1998) culture realizes itself as well through creation of sense and meaning, especially in times of crises or challenge (creative perspective). It is a character of traditional attitude to conceptualize culture in reference to history or what is thought/said to be the history of a social group. Drawing identity concepts from cultural frameworks of the past leads the attention to categories of race, ethnicity, religion, language, and common territories. Drawing identity concepts from cultural frameworks developed in relation to present challenges or crises (future aspect) leads the attention to the potentials of rooms to move: discourses, creative language, and unaccustomed performances.



All in all, the cultural competence (which includes ability, readiness, authority, and responsibility (Bauer 2014: 219 f.) of any social amalgamation relies on:

- Sources of historically developed programs of assimilation to and accommodation of environmental conditions of life, from where it may draw models of knowledge and models of reality (Schmidt 2003: 34), and equally on
- Resources of creatively developed and proved programs of appropriation of meaning, of realities and environmental conditions of life. The (socio-cultural) way of appropriation of reality is communication (cf. Certeau 1988).

In the same way as communication and interaction maintain a framework of reference (and even: order) of reality (sharing meanings) by permanent changing performance, character and media (discourse) (Foucault 1988), culture (meaningful social practice) maintains a framework of reference negotiating collective identity by permanent trying out its potentials of development, change and variety. Thus development, change, and variety can be taken as the intrinsic characters of cultural unity and universality, which get expressed and symbolically mediated in diversity. Diversity is a matter of media (performance) through which culture expresses the intrinsic competence of variety and plurality. In this context of reflecting the rationality of culture, which is based in reasons of diverse mediation of communication, it seems that the concepts of multi-culturality, inter-culturality or trans-culturality (Hepp/Löffelholz 2002) were just theoretical surrogate of the concept of diversity. Those concepts clearly state diversity as a fact and result of experience. The power of facts is becoming a concept of understanding reality. Diversity is becoming a concept of social calculation. Obviously, the concept of diversity replaces other concepts of social amalgamation, which determined the society for long periods. Social co-existence (closeness) and social segregation (separation) are the two sides of a unity, which is sociality. Both sides include a decision in reference to a cultural program, from which man learned to use models of knowledge and wisdom in order to distinguish between unity and plurality (Schmidt 2003: 38). Such distinction (differentiation) decides on certainty and trust in self- identity and on identification of others. There is a strong anthropological and cultural desire to make identity true. Both concepts, certainty of social and cultural existence and security as a public value, have to do with right of defining reality or even truth and not at least with claim of truth. For that it needs figures of evidence. Plurality (which is, of course, not the same like diversity, but is the basic concept of diversity), generality, and unity are such qualities and categories of orientation. But: Generality mostly is used in the sense of universality, which insinuates: generality is, when the same feature is given to different things, it always represents the majority and the majority always is supposed to keep the evidence of right (Bauer 2006: 247).



### **Political and Media Literacy: New Deals on Building Identity and Togetherness**

In contemporary context Turkey is seriously struggling for identity and togetherness. Protests, demonstrations, the dispute on European approximation getting more and more controversial, the international reaction on reconstruction of state of constitution, and, last but not least, the attempted coup – all those are factors of perturbation and threats for public security sphere. Such a complex situation calls more than ever for identity as a factor of togetherness. But in a media-open society, identity has become a concept of open mind. Any temptation to reinstall traditional factors of identity building has to face the challenge of cultural, social and media change. The modern political theory refers to the enlightenment that national identity has become obsolete and was not any more a proper concept in times of globalization and within the context of (cf. Bauer 2006a, Charalambis 2004). But, obviously, reality and practice do not follow the normative knowledge.

It has to be taken as an invention of the era of nation-states and of a banal nationalism (Billig 1995) that national identity has its certain categories or factors: language, religion, history, territory. That conception of identity is not only theoretically too simple, it is also persuasive and tendentious. As any other group community, national communities emerge through delimitation from “the others” which requires for markers like territory, language, religion, history. All those criteria, of course, result in consequences on the allocation of rights (Törnquist-Plewa 1998: 100). Making this believe completely accepted requires a strong mobilisation, when national identity should be stronger than any other referential identity.

It needs a new public deal, negotiated in frame of politically uploaded media discourse, in order to create new metaphors of identity as a social source of security, both, related to a dialectic history as well as to a diverse future (cf. Berger / Luckmann 1972). Such a deal only can be designed and developed in frames of democratic structures of civic participation in climate of open and dialectic public communication.

That needs competence and literacy, political literacy and media literacy, especially on the level of usage of media: The audience, always linked to its societal environment and struggling to come clear with its expectations on public communication within social conversation. Media Literacy is an educational term, meaning the cognitive, social and cultural habit of a personally and societally reasonable usage of media, related to culturally tied values of political, social and individual communication and its relevance for the societal construction of everyday social practice.

Living in a Media Society (cf. Descharmes / Heuser / Loy 2011, Strosetzki 2013) demands to be aware of the media-specific structures of social practice and of the media-affiliated character of doing the society: Media (Mediality, Media Usage) has become a concept of the individual

observation of societal, cultural and symbolic environment and a key to make accessible the options of social construction of reality (cf. Berger / Luckmann.1972). Being interested in a future sustainable development of societal conditions (structures and cultures) of quality of life under conditions of a media- societal environment challenges every individual and the societies as such to invest into individual and social media literacy meaning a media-affiliated concept of communication competence (cf. Bauer 2014: 219).

The social media movement – not only but in a special way - mirrors new perspectives of social practice, so far not yet enough embedded into traditional media orders, or, shapes new habits of social practice (network-communication) that designs the future values of social change. Media literacy, understood as a cultural good, developed through mutually expected patterns, is the source of media culture. There is no sense in compensating the dilemma of the society on shoulders of individuals of only one side. Because the overall problem to be solved is media and communication competence as a habit and a tool for a democratic society – which is a cultural challenge, any effort in enriching the journalism competence has to be completed by enriching the media literacy of the public (cf. Bourdieu 1997). Therefore, the program has to be continued and the next step has to be the development of programs in media education.

The role of media has to be rethought in this context. It has become a remarkable aspect of communications research that former reference points in shaping identity – borders of religion, culture, ethnicity, nationality, race, etc. – are going to be replaced by much more mobile, hybrid and virtual ones, by the discourse models of media communication. Media, as the agencies of public discourse, have to take over the task of critical reflection on the workings society. They are the instruments of a cultural catharsis, when and where a society is in need of restoring or re-inventing itself. Media have the connective capacity to observe the public conversation (meta-communication), to enlarge it where information is too limited, and to enrich it where the discourse-content is too thin or too shallow, to intervene from the outside when conversation is too introverted, to steer from the inside when the discourse gets lost in translation.

And while they may be under pressure to reduce the complexity of programs for financial reasons, it may also be their responsibility to return a reasonable complexity to their consideration of social and political life.

Mobilizing this critical self-awareness is a question of competence in living and surviving under conditions of an ever-changing environment; it is a pragmatic view of ethics and an ethical use of practice. This pragmatic and ethical horizon of self-realization has to be brought into the public discourse; it is a kind of intelligent and therapeutic rule breaking that – in context of society – can only be done by the kind of collective power the media represent. As the media are agencies of topical social interaction, they represent the social competence of a society, for which critical self-observation is one of the key skills.





This of course demands a media culture that cares about the stakes of all participating individuals, peoples and institutions, where owners, editors, journalists and the public – all by their own capacities – share the responsibility of public consciousness. All remarks concerning the notion of competence must be done in order to argue that all projects just make sense, when they refer to the communicative construction of society and the societal construction of communication.

The fact that society is constructed by its (non-media- and/or media-mediated) communication makes it worth to take a look at the quality of communication. The fact that communication (non-media- and/or media-mediated) in its cultural construction is preconditioned by societal structures makes it worth to take a look at the (civil and political) quality of society. The theoretical decision for society conceptualisation in a sense of an event of social communication and communication as a question of its societal conditions is to be taken as a precondition for reflection of the relationship between society and media, or better said, the relationship between the quality of society and that one of its media. In that sense, the normative understanding of society, by which communication and/or media competence becomes arguable, should be kept in mind as a specification of societal and social competence and as a cultural resource of society building.

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## Information Security and Image of Turkey in the Global Media



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